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RICCI V. DESTEF AND: THE NEW HAVEN 
FIREFIGHTERS CASE & THE TRIUMPH 
OF WHITE PRIVILEGE 
MARK S. BRODIN* 
By order of this Court, New Haven, a city in which African Americans 
and Hispanics account for nearly 60 percent of the population, must to-
day be served-as it was in the days of undisguised discrimination-by a 
fire department in which members of racial and ethnic minorities are 
rarely seen in command positions. In arriving at its order, the Court 
barely acknowledges the pathmarking decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 u.s. 42 (1971), which explained the centrality of the disparate-
impact concept to effective enforcement of Title VII. The Court's order 
and opinion, I anticipate, will not have staying power. I 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Seated in a front row at the confirmation hearing for Judge Sonia So-
tomayor in the summer of 2009 were several New Haven firefighters in 
dress uniform, present at the behest of Republicans actively opposing the 
appointment of the first Latina to the Supreme Court.2 Frank Ricci, lead 
plaintiff in the reverse discrimination case bearing his name decided just 
weeks before, would be the opponents' star witness. 3 He had quickly be-
* Professor and Lee Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School; J.D., Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law, 1972; B.A., Columbia College, 1969. The author wishes to acknowledge 
the insightful comments on earlier drafts by Michael C. Harper, Charles A. Sullivan, and his 
colleague Intisar Rabb, as well as the research assistance of Susannah Cotter, Clair Collins, and 
Brian Vavra, and the financial support of Michael and Helen Lee. 
©Mark S. Brodin 
I Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
2 Melissa Bailey, Ricci Takes the Stand, NEW HAVEN INDEP., July 16, 2009, available at 
http://www. newhavenindependent. org/index. php/archives/entry/ricci _takes_the _standi. 
3 Ronald Dworkin, Justice Sotomayor: The Unjust Hearings, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 24, 
2009, at 37, 38; Melissa Bailey, Ricci Takes the Stand, NEW HAVEN INDEP., July 16, 2009, 
available at http://www .newhavenindependent.org/index. php/ archives/ entry/ricci_takes _the _ sta 
ndl. 
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come a "folk hero for white men everywhere,,,4 much like Brian Weber5 
and Allan Bakke6 had years before when they challenged race-conscious 
efforts to bring minorities into the factory workplace and medical schooe 
The firefighters opposed Judge Sotomayor's confirmation because 
she had participated on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel that un-
animously affirmed a district court ruling against Ricci and his fellow fire-
fighters (seventeen white and one Hispanic).8 Their presence, including 
Ricci's testimony, was central to the ultimately unsuccessful fight against 
Sotomayor's confirmation, as it sought to demonstrate her bias against (or 
at least insensitivity to) white males.9 
The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit by deciding in 
Ricci v. DeStefano that the white firefighters who topped the civil service 
list by virtue of their multiple-choice test scores were entitled to promo-
tion, notwithstanding New Haven's concern that the exams failed to mea-
ningfully identify supervisory skills and excluded all the black candidates 
from consideration. 1O The five-to-four decision, authored by Justice An-
thony Kennedy, potentially guts Title VII's 11 disparate-impact prohibi-
tion,12 which in the past decades has been the engine driving real progress 
in equal employment opportunity.13 As the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
feared, the Court established a rule "that avoidance of discrimination 
against African Americans necessarily amounts to intentional discrimina-
tion against whites," and thus "require[s] employers to maintain employ-
4 Dahlia Lithwick, The New Haven Firefighter Is No Stranger to Employment Dii>putes, 
SLATE MAG. (July 10, 2009), http://www.slate.comlidl2222087/.InI995. Ricci sued New Ha-
ven arguing violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that he was not hired as a 
firefighter because he was dyslexic. Id. The case was settled two years later when the City 
agreed to appoint him. Id. The next year, Ricci threatened a lawsuit against the Middletown Fire 
Department, where he was briefly employed, claiming his dismissal was in retaliation for his 
role in an investigation of a controversial fire. Id. 
S See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see also What the We-
ber Ruling Does, TIME, July 9, 1979, at 48. 
6 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose, 
TIME. July 10,1978, at 8-16 (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision). 
87. 
7 See supra notes 5 and 6. 
R Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 Fed. Appx. 106 (2d Cir. 2008), superceded and aff'd 530 F.3d 
9 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 38. 
10 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-65. 
11 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e e/ seq. 
12 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
13 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
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ment practices that perpetuate discrimination against minorities.,,14 Going 
even further, Justice Scalia suggests in a concurring opinion that the dispa-
rate-impact provisions are unconstitutional in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. ls 
Misrepresented in much of the media as a case pitting merit against 
affirmative action,16 Ricci v. DeStefano, more accurately, re-defined merit 
by equating it with success on multiple-choice examinations, as opposed 
to more reliable methods of personnel selection. Despite the persistent gap 
between white and minority scores on these devices, as well as the ab-
sence of evidence of their predictive validity,17 employers are now encour-
aged to continue to rely (at relatively small expense) on such exams as the 
primary determinant of advancement in the workplace. More sophisticated 
sorting methods, which do not disproportionately exclude protected 
groups, such as those used by the military,18 may be ignored. As two early 
commentators put it, Ricci decided "who gets the good jobs in cities across 
America.,,19 
14 Jd. at 2-3 (alteration in original). 
15 Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2682-83 (Scalia, 1., concurring). Justice Scalia's concern for equal 
treatment seems to extend primarily to white job seekers, including Republican Presidential can-
didates. See Bush v. Gore, 53 I U.S. 98 (2000) (manual recounts of Florida votes for President in 
the 2000 election did not satisfy requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters, and thus vi-
olated Equal Protection). 
16 See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, The Supreme Court Says No to Quotas, WALL ST. J., July 
I, 2009; Carole Bass, Justices Zero in on Race-Based Distinctions, NEW HAVEN INDEP., Apr. 
22, 2009, available at http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index. php/archives/entry/justices 
_zero_in_onJace-based_distinctions/. The Ricci plaintiffs and their attorney invested much time 
and energy portraying the case as "a symbol for millions of Americans who have grown tired of 
seeing individual achievement and merit take a back seat to race and ethnicity." A.G. Sulzberg-
er, For Hispanic Firefighter in Bias Suit, Awkward Position but Firm Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, July 
3, 2009, at A20. The successful lawyer in another reverse discrimination case involving four 
white men passed over in favor of minorities on the civil service list for the Boston Fire Depart-
ment sounded the same note: "I think hopefully we're just going back to normal, the way it was 
meant to be, so that now they are just hiring the best person, regardless of race or color." Shelley 
Murphy, Judge Tells City to Hire Four White Firefighters, BoS. GLOBE, Aug. 26,2003, at AI. 
There is rarely even a hint in the media coverage that the multiple-choice exams from 
which the civil service lists are generated may not fairly identify "the best person" for the job, a 
point which Judge Sotomayer repeatedly made during testy exchanges at her confirmation hear-
ings: "This was not a quotas case. This was not an affirmative action case. This was a challenge 
to a test that everybody agreed had a very wide difference between the pass rate of a variety of 
different groups." Melissa Bailey, Sotomayor Speaks on Ricci, NEW HAVEN INDEP., July 14, 
2009, available at http://newhavenindependent.orglarchives/2009/07 Isotomayor _Ieahy.php. 
17 See irifra Part VI.A. 
18 See infra Part VI.C. 
19 Nicole Allan & Emily Bazelon, The Ladder, SLATE MAG. (June 25, 2009), 
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Four of the five justices joining the prevailing opinion are white 
males, and the fifth is an African American who has become the foremost 
opponent of any remedial race-conscious efforts at equality, which he 
views as the legal and moral equivalent of the most egregious forms of 
discrimination from our past. 20 That the five had to contort established 
rules of procedure to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on 
a wholly inadequate record21 raises serious question about the real nature 
of their enterprise, especially since in federal courts it is defendant em-
ployers, not plaintiff employees, who are routinely granted summary 
judgment at an "alarming rate.,,22 
Through the cynical alchemy of the Roberts Court's decision-
making,23 the landmark statute for advancing the employment prospects of 
minorities and women has become the vehicle for preserving white privi-
lege?4 The arguments of the Ricci plaintiffs, credited by some on the 
Court/5 raised the dubious specter of employers sacrificing their white 
employees by "surrender[ing] to organized racial lobbies,,,26 a theme not 
inconsistent with the fear mongering surrounding the election of Ameri-
ca's first black president. Yet white firefighters like the Ricci plaintiffs 
need not fear the loss of their careers to racial minorities, as the percentage 
of professional black firefighters has declined by nearly half over the past 
few decades.27 
http://www.slate.comltoolbar .aspx?action=print&id=222 1250. 
20 See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 69-112. See also Parents Involved in Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (Thomas, 1., concurring) ("[Allowing] school boards a free hand to make deci-
sions on the basis of race ... [is] an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregation-
ists in Brown v. Board of Education .... "). 
21 See infra Part lILA. 
22 Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the JlJusion of Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 592 (2000). 
23 See Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy: The Supreme Court's Stealth Hard-liner, 
THE NEW YORKER, May 25,2009, at 42 (documenting the Court's sharp right tum); Adam Lip-
tak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 2009, at AI; Adam Lip-
tak, The Roberts Court: The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at 
AI; RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 81 (2008). 
24 Title VII has long been held to protect white victims of discrimination equally with non-
whites. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976). But the 
Court had never ruled that an employer who complies with the disparate impact prohibition the-
reby violates the Act's prohibition against disparate treatment. See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part II. B. 
26 Brief for Petitioner at 30, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) 
(alteration in original). 
27 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici' 
2011] RICCI V DESTEFANO 165 
Barack Obama's ascendency, together with the dramatic economic 
downturn and the evolving demographic shift away from a white majority 
have stirred up extremist groups on the political right, and created an 
ominous backlash which first manifested itself in the town meetings held 
around the proposals for healthcare reform in August 2009.28 A column by 
former presidential candidate and pervasive cable news personality Patrick 
Buchanan, entitled Traditional Americans Are Losing Their Nation, pur-
ports to explain why "white America" has been alienated and radicalized 
by Obama's election: "America was once their country. They sense they 
are losing it. And they are right.,,29 Ricci v. DeStefano unfortunately rein-
forces this narrative. 
This article begins (Part II) with a close critique of the Ricci decision. 
It then turns to Ricci's aftermath (Part III), both on remand and in a subse-
quent disparate impact suit against New Haven by an African American 
firefighter, drawing attention to the procedural irregularities of the Court's 
grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and the virtually unprece-
dented preclusion of future litigation by non-party litigants. Part IV as-
sesses the potentially devastating impact of the decision on Title VII's ef-
fectiveness, particularly in the historical context of racial discrimination 
within the Nation's fire departments (Part V). Part VI explores our socie-
ty's obsession with standardized testing, notwithstanding its many flaws 
and biases, and the stubborn refusal to get beyond the "gold star" mentali-
ty of elementary school days30 to consider alternative means of personnel 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
See also Danielle Ossher, Courtney Brooks & Walter Robinson, City Firehouses Still Stuck in a 
Racial Divide, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. I, 2010, at I (discussing declining percentage of black fire-
fighters in the Boston Fire Department). 
Moreover, the empirical data documents that minorities and women continue to fall far 
short of white males in the distribution of jobs and material wealth. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO & 
MELVIN L. OLIVER, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL 
INEQUALITY (1997); Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Trina Jones, A Post-Racial Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO LJ. 967, 982-89 (2010); Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Re-
mains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31 CAMPBELL L. REv. 503 (2009). 
28 See Gary Younge, Obama and the Decline of White America, The Nation, Oct. 26, 
2009, at 10; Dep't of Homeland Sec., Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political 
Climate Fueling Resurgence on Radicalization and Recruitment (2009); Frank Rich, There's A 
Battle Outside and It Is Still Ragin', N.Y. Times, July 24, 2010, at WK8. 
29 Patrick J. Buchanan, Traditional Americans are Losing Their Nation, 
WORwNETDAILY (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.wnd.com!index.php?pageId= 113463. 
30 Tellingly, Justice Scalia referred to the high-scorers (all whites) on New Haven's mul-
tiple-choice exams as the "winners," and the others as "losers." See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, at 10,42, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) [hereinafter Tr. Oral 
Arg.]. 
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selection. 
II. RICCI V. DESTEFANO 
A. BACKGROUND 
In late 2003, to fill vacancies in the ranks of lieutenant and captain31 
in its fire department, the City of New Haven set in motion selection pro-
cedures pursuant to the City Charter and the collective bargaining agree-
ment.32 The former establishes a "merit system" that requires the City to 
fill vacancies on the basis of job-related examinations administered by the 
Civil Service Board (CSB).33 The CSB then certifies a list of candidates in 
the order of their scores.34 From there, the "rule of three" requires the hir-
ing authority to choose one candidate from the top three scorers. 35 The 
bargaining agreement between the City and the firefighters' union requires 
both written and oral examinations: the written component counting 60% 
and the oral component counting 40% towards the candidate's total 
score.36 To be eligible to sit for the exams, a candidate must meet mini-
mum experience requirements within the Department, have a high school 
diploma, and have completed specified vocational training courses.37 
The City retained a consultant, Industrial/Organizational Solutions, 
Inc. (lOS), to develop and administer the examinations.38 lOS, which spe-
cializes in testing for police and fire departments, performed job analyses 
to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for the lieutenant 
and captain positions, and then devised tests purportedly to measure these 
values?9 Accordingly, lOS created two one-hundred-question multiple-
31 In order of progression, Lieutenant is the first rank and captain is the second rank. See 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009). 
32 [d. at 26M--65. 
33 Id. at 2665. 
34 Id. at 2665. The Preamble of the Charter provides that "it is the public policy of the City 
of New Haven to ensure full and equitable participation of all citizens in all aspects of the life of 
the city without regard to race .... " NEW HAVEN, CT., CODE TIT. I (1992), available at 
http://1ibrary.municode.comlHTMLl14668/levelllT/T/CH.html. Embedded in this simple and 
uncontroversial aspiration is the dilemma raised by Ricci. Does this provision forbid the City 
from scuttling the exam results, or require it? 
35 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665. 
36 Id. 
37 I d. 
38 I d. 
39 Id. 
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choice exams, written below a tenth-grade reading level, derived from 
training manuals and other materials, which were identified to candidates 
for their study during a three-month period before the exams were admi-
nistered.40 The written component tested the skills of reading and memori-
zation, as well as factual knowledge.41 
The oral examinations consisted of hypothetical situations designed 
to measure incident-command skills, fire fighting tactics, interpersonal 
skills, leadership, and management ability.42 To conduct the oral compo-
nent, thirty assessors were chosen, all of whom were out-of-state firefight-
er officials, and divided into nine three-member panels.43 Sixty-six percent 
of the candidate pool were minorities, and each panel conducting the oral 
examinations included two minority panelists.44 The panelists received 
training the day before the exam on how to score the candidates' responses 
on a checklist.45 
The exams were administered in November and December of 2003.46 
The lieutenants' exam attracted seventy-seven candidates: forty-three 
whites, nineteen blacks, and fifteen Hispanics.47 The thirty-four passers 
consisted of twenty-five whites, six blacks, and three Hispanics.48 The civ-
il service "rule-of-three" operated to make only the top ten passers eligible 
for promotion to the eight vacant positions, all of whom were white.49 For-
ty-one applicants completed the captains' exam: twenty-five whites, eight 
blacks, and eight Hispanics.50 Of the twenty-two passers, sixteen were 
white, three black, and three Hispanic. 51 Those eligible for promotion, 
seven whites and two Hispanics, included none of the black candidates. 
Not one of the twenty-seven black applicants would, as a result, be pro-
40 1d. 
41 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2695 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brieffor Industrial-Organizayional 
Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 
2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) [hereinafter lOP Amicus Br.]. 
42 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666. 
43 1d. 
44 Jd. 
45/d. 
46/d. 
47 Jd. 
4X Jd. 
49/d. 
SO/d. 
SlId. 
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moted to either position. 52 As openings in supervisory positions usually 
occur only every few years, 53 advancement for black candidates was thus 
foreclosed for that indefinite period of time. 54 
Although its contract with the City committed lOS to submit a tech-
nical report that analyzed the results of the examination, the City opted in-
stead to meet with the lOS team and express its concern that the tests dis-
criminated against minority candidates, which lOS denied. 55 The City's 
counsel also raised these apprehensions with the CSB, the independent 
entity charged with overseeing the selection process. 56 
The CSB convened a series of meetings to consider the significant 
disparities between the performance of white and non-white candidates on 
the tests, the validity of the exams as predictors of job performance, and 
the existence of alternatives, such as utilizing "assessment centers" (where 
applicants are asked to evaluate and respond to real-world situations) or 
readjusting the 60% written to 40% percent oral exam scoring ratio. 57 The 
CSB heard from firefighters both in favor of and opposed to certifying the 
test results. 58 The lead test developer for lOS appeared and assured the 
CSB: "In my professional opinion, it's facially neutral. There's nothing in 
those examinations . . . that should cause somebody to think that one 
group would perform differently than another groUp.,,59 
But other testing experts disagreed and expressed concern about the 
racial disparities in the scores.60 One testified that the exams had "signifi-
cant adverse impact" on blacks, more dramatic than in comparable situa-
tions.6l A psychology professor from Boston College, Janet Helms, re-
ported that, "regardless of what kind of written test we give in this country 
52 1d. 
53 Joint App. at 76, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) [hereinafter 
Joint App.]. 
54 The racial make-up of the fire department's 336 members was as follows: 53% of the 
firefighters were white, 30% black, and 16% Hispanic; of lieutenants, 63% white, 22% black, 
and 16% Hispanic; of captains, 86% were white, 4% black, and 9% Hispanic. Jd. at 217. There 
were two black battalion chiefs among the seven, and no Hispanics; among the four dcputy 
chiefs, there was one Hispanic, and no blacks. ld. There was clearly a significant underrepresen-
tation of black firefighters at supervisory and upper levels. 
55 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666. 
56 ld. at 2666-67. 
57 Jd. at 2667--69. 
58 / d. at 2667. 
59 1d. at 2668. 
60 Joint App., supra note 53, at 93. 
611d. 
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... we can just about predict how many people will pass who are members 
of under-represented groups. And your data are not that inconsistent with 
what predictions would say were the case.,,62 Helms added that written 
tests, in particular, "would have revealed a disparity between blacks and 
whites, [and] Hispanics and whites.,,63 Several witnesses discussed alter-
native methods of evaluation.64 Evidence indicated that the neighboring 
city of Bridgeport, for example, was able to achieve considerable diversity 
in its supervisory firefighter ranks by modifying the relative weights of the 
components of its process to 30% written and 65% percent oral, with the 
remaining 5% representing seniority.65 This was one of several less dis-
criminatory alternatives identified in the CSB proceedings.66 
When the CSB finally decided not to certify the examination re-
sults,67 twenty firefighters, nineteen white and one Hispanic,68 dubbed the 
"New Haven 20" by the local press,69 sued under Title VII's disparate-
treatment (intentional discrimination) provisions, and also alleged viola-
tion of their constitutional right to equal protection.70 The Cit/1 defended 
itself by arguing that certifying the examination results would have sub-
jected it to suit by minority firefighters claiming disparate impact, Title 
VII's other core prohibition, and that it acted in good faith to avoid that 
62 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2669. 
63 Id. (alteration in original). 
64 Id. at 2670. 
65 lOP Amicus Br., supra note 41, at 26. 
66 Id. at 26-27. 
67 The vote at the five-member CSB was split, two for certification and two against. Brief 
for Respondents at 10, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). The one black 
member recused herself at the request of the petitioners' counsel. Id. at 6-7. The two members 
voting against certification expressed concerns about the validity of the test based on the testi-
mony they heard. Joint App., supra note 53, at 166-67; Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 34. 
68 Only fourteen of the group would have been promoted in rank order from the eligibility 
list; four did not score high enough to be reached, and two failed the test. Telephone Interview 
with Victor A. Bolden, New Haven Corp. Counsel (Mar. 25, 2010). 
69 See, e.g., Colin Ross, Firefighters Move For Promotions, YALE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 
2009, http://www.yaledailynews.comlnews/2009/nov/15/firefighters-move-for-promotions/. 
70 See Barbara Jean D'Aquila, A Management Employment Lawyer's Perspective on Ricci 
v. DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213 (2010). The Supreme Court chose to decide the 
case under the broader provisions of Title VII, which apply to both public and private employ-
ers. Id. 
71 Also joined as defendants were the Mayor, members of the CSB, and a city resident 
who had voiced strong opposition to certification of the results. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 
2658,2671 (2009). 
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consequence.72 Plaintiffs derided this "feigned desire to 'comply' with 
Title VII" as a pretext for favoring the interests of black firefighters and 
political supporters of the mayor in the black community.73 
In this "reverse discrimination" context, the usual roles of the parties 
were indeed reversed.74 The defendant employer was in the awkward posi-
tion of asserting that its own practices produced discriminatory impact. 75 
Conversely, the plaintiffs asserted that the exams were job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, and thus lawfuC6 Significantly, no mi-
nority firefighters or their representatives appeared as a party in the case.77 
This deprived the courts of a crucial perspective, most notably one that 
protested the lack of meaningful correlation between the multiple-choice 
examinations and likely success as a fire officer. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the federal 
district court. Judge Janet Bond Arterton granted summary judgment in 
the City's favor: "Notwithstanding the shortcomings in the evidence on 
existing, effective alternatives, it is not the case that [employers] must cer-
tify a test where they cannot pinpoint its deficiency explaining its dispa-
rate impact ... simply because they have not yet formulated a better selec-
tion method.,,78 She ruled that the City's "motivation to avoid making 
promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact ... does not, as 
a matter oflaw, constitute discriminatory intent" under Title VII.79 
The district court found no evidence of "discriminatory animus" to-
wards the plaintiffs, and noted that the City acted on concerns that the test 
was "statistically adverse" against blacks and Hispanics; that "promoting 
off of this list would undermine [the] goal of diversity in the Fire Depart-
ment and would fail to develop managerial role models for aspiring fire-
fighters"; and that the test would "subject the City to public criticism" and 
to "Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants that, for political reasons, 
the City did not want to defend.,,80 These concerns, Judge Arterton found, 
72 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142,151--53 (D. Conn. 2006). 
73 ld. at 153. 
74 1d. at 152. 
75 !d. 
76 1d. 
77 See infra note 225 for a discussion of whether they were obligated to intervene, or 
whether the plaintiffs were required to join them. 
78 ld. at 156 (alteration in original). 
79 1d. at 160 
xo ld. at 162. 
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represented an attempt "to remedy the disparate impact" of the tests and 
not "to discriminate against non-minority applicants."sl 
The Second Circuit summarily affirmed in a one-paragraph per cu-
riam opinion, adopting the district court's reasoning. 82 The Supreme 
Court, in a five-to-four split, reversed.83 
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court is founded on the dubious 
premise, particularly given the district court's explicit factual findings to 
the contrary,84 that since the City refused to certify the results based on its 
concern for the racial distribution of scores, the City consequently discri-
minated against the plaintiffs in violation of the disparate-treatment prohi-
bition.85 Acting to avoid disparate-impact liability was not, the majority 
concluded, a defense. 86 
81 Jd. 
82 264 Fed. Appx. 106. The court voted seven to six against granting a rehearing en banco 
Ricci V. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008). Judge Cabranes wrote for the dissenters, who 
would have reheard the case, posing the question provocatively: "Maya municipal employer 
disregard the results of a qualifying examination, which was carefully crafted to ensure race-
neutrality, on the ground that the results of that examination yielded too many qualified appli-
cants of one race and not enough of another?" Jd. at 93~-94. In reality, the Griggs principle re-
quires more than careful crafting, which is no substitute for achieving a selection process that 
avoids non-job-related barriers to minority advancement. See infra Part IV. 
83 Ricci V. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
84 A district court's findings of fact regarding discriminatory intent, or lack thereof, are 
binding absent a determination that they are "clearly erroneous" under FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). See 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 284-90 (1982). 
While the district court concluded that a "jury could infer that the defendants were moti-
vated by a concern that too many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted," and 
that "the City's reasons for advocating non-certification were related to the racial distribution of 
the results," it found nothing in the transcripts of the hearings before the CSB, the main record 
before the court, that evidenced a desire or intent to favor blacks at the expense of whites. Ricci 
V. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006). 
85 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-65. 
86 Jd. But if the City acted in order to avoid disparately impacting (and thus being sued by) 
black candidates whose true qualifications may have been misjudged by the exams, then the City 
was decidedly not acting "because of race." See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 
(1993) (employer who terminates older employee to prevent his pension benefits from vesting 
under ten-year rule did not act because of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. V. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (civil service veter-
ans' preference was not discriminatory because of gender, but simply a preference for veterans 
of either sex). It is thus well-settled that disparate treatment occurs where the decision-maker 
acts because of, not merely in spite of, the adverse consequences upon an identifiable group. 
Accordingly, the Government argued that "[a]n employer [like New Haven] that takes ac-
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As in several recent decisions,87 the Court disingenuousll8 refused to 
acknowledge the difference between decisions motivated by racial animus 
and those in which the actor, be it an employer or educational institution, 
adopts race-conscious remedies to target the persistent exclusion or under-
representation of disadvantaged groups: 
Whatever the City's ultimate aim~however well intentioned or benevo-
lent it might have seemed~the City made its employment decision be-
cause of race. The City rejected the test results solell9 because the high-
er scoring candidates were white. The question is not whether that 
conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a lawful justifica-
tion for its race-based action. 90 
Justice Kennedy rejected the plaintiffs' position that Title VII strictly 
forbids an employer from ever taking race-based action to avoid disparate-
impact liability, or that it requires the employer to demonstrate the impact 
violation before it can take corrective action, as these would effectively 
delete that crucial dimension of the statute recognized in Griggs v. Duke 
tion in response to a disparate impact of an employment test among candidates generally does 
not thereby intend to discriminate against any individual non-minority candidate who did well 
on the test." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 
II, Ricci v. DeStefano. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). And Justice Ginsburg so con-
cludes in her dissent: "When employers endeavor to avoid exposure to disparate-impact liability, 
they do not thereby encounter liability for disparate treatment." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2709 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
Even Justice Alito's concurrence inadvertently confirms this point. Id. at 2684. If, as he 
asserts, the City acted "to placate a politically important racial constituency," id., then it was not 
discriminating against the Ricci plaintiffs because of race, anymore than Hazen Paper Co. was 
because of age, or the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts because of gender. In short, 
Justice Kennedy's narrative of intentional discrimination against the white firefighters has little 
support in either the record or the law. 
X7 See. e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (holding voluntary student assignment plans designed to achieve racial diversity in public 
schools are unconstitutional). 
8X Chief Justice Roberts' question at oral argument, "How do you draw the line between 
race-conscious that's permitted and racial discrimination that's not?," Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 
30, at 41, had already been answered by him earlier when he devised his bumper-sticker slogan: 
"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race." Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
89 Justice Kennedy ignores the considerable discussion at the CSB that focused on the ab-
sence of any meaningful relation between performance on the exams and likely success as a su-
pervisor in the NHFD, which is what the dissent refers to as "substantial evidence of multiple 
flaws in the tests New Haven used." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice 
Kennedy later pulled back on this statement that the City acted "solely because the higher scor-
ing candidates were white" when he ended his opinion with: "the raw racial results became the 
predominant rationale for the City's refusal to certify the results." Id. at 2681 (emphasis added). 
90 Id at 2674. 
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Power CO.,91 and codified in the 1991 amendment. 92 His resolution of the 
perceived conflict between Title VII's two mandates, however, leads to a 
similar result-the de-fanging of the disparate-impact principle. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion elevated what he sees as the "original, 
foundational" prohibition93 against disparate treatment over the late-
comer, disparate impact. 94 Leaving aside the real possibility that the 
Griggs principle was embedded in the very broad language of the original 
1964 act and was only explicitly teased out in the 1971 decision,95 as well 
as the perplexing question why Congress would codify the disparate-
impact provision if it were in direct contradiction to the core proscription 
of the statute, Kennedy's resolution imported the unduly strict standard 
from the affirmative action cases decided under the Equal Protection 
Clause,96 requiring public actors to have a "strong basis in evidence" to 
believe they will be subject to disparate-impact liability before they may 
resort to remedial action.97 The City's good faith belief that the 2003 se-
lection process unnecessarily harmed minorities was thus not deemed suf-
ficient. 98 Any more lenient standard, Kennedy asserted, raises the risk of 
that old reliable boogey-man: a quota system favoring minorities or wom-
99 en. 
Justice Kennedy asserts that his "strong basis" standard "leaves am-
91 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
92 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991 ) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
93 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009). 
94 Id. 
95 The original statute makes it unlawful "to limit, segregate, or classifY his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
96 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Richmond v. l.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and 
Wygant v. lackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). 
97 I d. 
98 See id. 
99 See generally Robin Stryker, Disparate Impact and the Quota Debates: Law, Labor 
Market Sociology, and Equal Employment Policies, 42 Soc. Q. 13 (2001) (discussing the use of 
"quota rhetoric" to oppose both affirmative action and disparate impact enforcement). The ma-
jority thus adopts the plaintiffs' characterization that the City's actions "are effectively indistin-
guishable from the imposition of racial quotas." Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 20, Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). Fear of such quotas seems quite overblown, 
as the "history of the racial quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence." Richmond v. 1.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, 1., concurring) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, 
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1977)). 
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pIe room for employers' voluntary compliance efforts," which he recog-
nizes "are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress's efforts to 
eradicate workplace discrimination."\OO "[We do not] question an employ-
er's affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to 
apply for promotions and to participate in the process by which promo-
tions will be made." Employers are therefore not limited to those situa-
tions where there is "a provable, actual violation."I0\ 
But it would appear that in the zero-sum world of employment oppor-
tunities, virtually any effort on the part of an employer to avoid disparate 
impact on some employees will cause disparate treatment to others, and 
thus be in presumptive violation of the statute. The strong-basis-in-
evidence standard is explicitly designed by the Court to constrain employ-
ers' "discretion in making race-based decisions" to "certain, narrow cir-
cumstances.,,\02 Thus the undisputed existence of a prima facie case of 
disparate impact arising from the 2003 NHFD exams was insufficient to 
constitute a "strong basis in evidence" justifying remedial action. 103 
Justice Kennedy ultimately revealed what may have been his real 
concern with the City's actions: 
Examinations like those administered by the City create legitimate ex-
pectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with any 
promotion exam, some oj the firefighters here invested substantial time, 
money, and personal commitment in preparingjor the tests. Employment 
tests can be an important part of a neutral selection system that safe-
guards against the very racial animosities Title VII was intended to pre-
vent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the 
City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics. 
100 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, at 2676 (2009). The Justice Department had urged 
the Court to adopt a more flexible "reasonable basis" standard. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 15-19, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 
(2009) (No. 07-1428). 
Chief Justice Roberts cynically began his questioning of the deputy solicitor general at 
oral argument: 
So, can you assure me that the government's position would be the same if this test-·-
black applicants-firefighters scored highest on this test in disproportionate numbers, 
and the City said we don't like that result, we think there should be more whites on the 
fire department, and so were going to throw the test out? The government of United 
States would adopt the same position? 
Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 28. Justice Scalia dismissed the Government's affinnative an-
swer. ld. at 35-36. 
101 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (alteration in original). 
1021d. at 2676. 
103 ld. at 2662. 
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... [O]nce [the] process has been established and employers have made 
clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, 
thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be judged on 
the basis of race. 104 
175 
Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the examination created entitle-
ments 105 for the high scorers that could be overcome only if the City had a 
"strong basis in evidence" that the exam violated the disparate-impact 
prohibition.106 To avoid litigation, Ricci teaches, employer's must scrap 
discriminatory exams before they administer them: 
Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before admi-
nistering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to 
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. 
And when, during the test-design stage, an employer invites comments to 
ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a common ground for 
open discussions toward that end. 107 
But has the Court not put employers in a Catch-22? They cannot dis-
regard the results of a test unless and until they have "strong" evidence of 
discrimination. But once the most compelling evidence of disparate-
104 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (emphasis added). 
105 Throughout the oral argument, counsel for Ricci et. al. asserted that they "already 
earned their promotions" by their scores on the tests. See Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 15, 23. 
Surprisingly, no justice explicitly corrected that statement. See id. To the contrary, the civil ser-
vice process merely results in a list of eligible candidates, in order of exam scores, but the "rule 
of three" allows the appointing authority to choose among the group. See id. The person at the 
top of the list, in other words, is not entitled to the appointment. See id. And, as the City argued, 
no one is entitled to promotion on the basis ofa "flawed or discriminatory test." See id. at 59. 
Moreover, courts have universally rejected the entitlement theory in this context. See. e.g., 
Bums v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 1980) (passed-over white male police officer had 
no right to be promoted despite his rank on eligible list); Callahan v. Pers. Adm'r, 400 Mass. 
597,601 (1987) ("Individuals on eligibility list for promotions do not have vested right in their 
particular positions on eligibility list once it is established."); Brackett v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 
447 Mass. 233, 252-53 (2006); Henry V. Civil Servo Comm'n, 2001 WL 862658, at *4 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 200 I). 
106 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. Similar entitlements have been held to flow from a se-
niority system, even if it produces discriminatory results by perpetuating past exclusionary prac-
tices. See Mark S. Brodin, The Role a/Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Se-
niority Question Under Title VlJ, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943 (1984) (elevating the "legitimate" 
expectations of senior white employees over the interests of minorities seeking a level playing 
field). 
107 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. Given the majority's hostility towards the impact prohibition, 
there is cause for skepticism as to whether earlier tinkering with the selection process would ac-
tually escape their condemnation. 
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impact liability appears, from actual results, the beneficiaries of that dis-
crimination become entitled to appointment. 108 
Having decided that New Haven could not scuttle the test results 
without a "strong basis in evidence" of disparate-impact liability, the 
Court concluded that there was no such basis.lo9 Consequently, finding no 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute and concluding they were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the Court granted summary judgment for 
the Ricci plaintiffs on their disparate-treatment claim.l1O 
This precipitous rush to judgment is accomplished in the face of the 
Court's candid recognition that "the racial adverse impact here was signif-
icant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima 
facie case of disparate-impact liability." 1 11 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy 
noted: 
On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent 
but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieu-
tenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for 
black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. 
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass 
rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by 
the EEOC [(Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)] to imple-
ment the disparate-impact provision of Title VII. 112 
108 As Justice Souter described the dilemma, 
[If the employer administers a test,] and they then see the disparate results, it's too late. 
And it seems to me that the trouble with drawing that distinction is that the city is not 
in the testing business. They are unlikely to know what the results are going to be. So 
[petitioners] are saying that the city that is prescient can adjust, the city that doesn't 
find out there's something wrong or at least undesirable from their standpoint until af-
ter the test results cannot readjust? 
Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 76-77. Kennedy neglects to mention that the EEOC Guidelines 
explicitly permit (and have for decades) an employer to utilize alternative selection procedures 
in order to eliminate adverse impact. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.3-1608.4 (2011). 
As New Haven Corporation Counsel Victor Bolden put it, while people have a sense of 
finality when the Supreme Court rules on a matter, the Ricci decision "created very little finality, 
and an increase in uncertainty" for the parties. Telephone Interview with Victor A. Bolden, New 
Haven Corp. Counsel (Mar. 25, 2010). 
109 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
110 Id. 
III Id. at 2677~ 78. 
112 Id. at 2678. In fact, looked at in terms of who was eligible for promotion, the picture 
was much starker. The highest scoring black candidate on the lieutenants' exam ranked thir-
teenth, and on the captains' fifteenth; the top Hispanic on the former was twenty-sixth. Jd. Two 
Hispanics were eligible on the captains' list. Id. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The prior ex-
ams, in 1999, also produced pass rates for minorities that were half that of white test-takers. Ric-
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Justice Kennedy properly pointed out that the prima facie case is just 
that-a threshold showing of "statistical disparity.,,113 But then the focus 
should have moved to whether the adverse impact was nonetheless justi-
fied because the exam was job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity, and if so, whether equally valid but less discriminatory alternatives 
existed. 114 Kennedy remarkably found in the record no genuine dispute on 
either issue, and answered yes on the first, and no on the second. I IS 
The record relied upon by the Court primarily consisted of the state-
ments, all unsworn,116 made during the CSB hearings.1I7 Because a party 
moving for summary judgment must set out admissible facts to demon-
strate that no reasonable fact-finder could rule for the opposing side, one 
would expect a remand would have been necessary to develop a more 
adequate record to properly evaluate the cross motions for summary 
judgment. I 18 This is especially true since neither the Supreme Court justic-
es, nor the lower courts, nor the witnesses before the CSB (other than the 
test developer), ever reviewed the actual exams at issue. I 19 Nonetheless, 
ci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 154 (D. Conn. 2006). 
113 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678. 
11442 U.S.c. § 2000e-k(I)(A) (2006). 
115 This ruling is particularly perplexing when one recalls that in the usual disparate-
impact context, the party asserting job relation~here the plaintiffs~would have the burden of 
proving it. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-k(l )(A)(i) (2006). See also Richard Primus, The Future o{ 
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1368 (2010). 
116 The Commission decided it was not necessary to swear witnesses. See Joint App., su-
pra note 53, at 109. 
117 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678. 
11K See infra Part III.A. 
119 The exam scores and lists were not released until after the Supreme Court decision. See 
Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 20 I 0 WL 2794231, at *2 (D. Conn. 20 I 0) (Ruling on Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification). The transcripts of the CSB hearings include only 
passing references to particular questions on the exams as remembered by firefighter witnesses. 
Id. In a similar situation, the Eleventh Circuit understandably held that no conclusion as to valid-
ity could be drawn where the test questions from the fire department promotional exam had 
"never made their way into evidence," nor been reviewed by any of the experts. Nash v. City of 
Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534,1536 (11th Cir. 1988). "Without the test itself and with no testimo-
ny presented by the defendant regarding the job-relatedness of the questions," the district court 
could not "conclude that the questions were job-related." Id. at 1538. The circuit judges "ex-
pressed wonder that any court should attempt to determine whether a written examination was 
'job-related' and 'content-valid' without having before it the questions asked of the applicants." 
Id, at 1536. In contrast to the Ricci majority, the Eleventh Circuit wisely rejected the defendant's 
argument that evidence of how the test was prepared was legally sufficient to show job-relation. 
Id. at 1537. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 268 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting) 
("[I]t is particularly inappropriate to decide the question [of validity of the test] on this record 
[where the examinations are not in the record]."). 
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Justice Kennedy somehow discerned conclusive evidence that the tests 
were job-related, consistent with business necessity, and that no less dis-
criminatory alternatives existed, thus permitting the Court to take the ex-
traordinary step of ordering summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 120 Al-
though the assessment of job-relatedness usually involves highly 
sophisticated analyses of empirical data,121 Justice Kennedy's "evidence" 
took the form of the not very surprising and unsworn verbal assurances 
from the lOS test developer himself. 122 
Justice Kennedy blamed the City because it "turned a blind eye to 
evidence that supported the exams' validity,,,123 referring to the City's 
failure to request the technical validation study prepared by the IOS.124 
But without such a study, how could he claim that the "lOS stood ready to 
provide [the City] with detailed information to establish the validity of the 
exams,,?125 Moreover, whether or not the City should be faulted for the ab-
sence of the report,126 granting summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs, based on the speculation that the study would have supported the 
lOS's claim to validity, appears an inappropriate penalty. 
To obtain summary judgment, the Ricci plaintiffs had the burden to 
demonstrate the absence of a triable issue on the validity of the tests. 127 
The dissenters argued that "the Court supplies no tenable explanation why 
the evidence of the tests' multiple deficiencies does not create at least a 
triable issue under [the new] strong-basis-in-evidence standard.,,128 More-
120 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
121 See infra Part VI.A. 
122 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2668. 
123 Jd. at 2679. 
124 !d. 
125 Jd. 
126 The City argued that even if the exams were validated, the experts were telling them 
that there were reasonable less discriminatory alternatives that would still render them liable 
under Title VII. See Burgett et al. Affidavit, attached to Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot. 
Summ.]. 
127 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
128 Jd. at 2707. Notwithstanding Professor Rutherglen's assertion that the City "steadfastly 
refused to argue, although it could readily have done so, that discarding the test results would 
have been in the interests of the community as a whole because the tests failed to measure the 
leadership necessary in a large, urban fire department," George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano: 
Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 84 (2010), New Haven 
forcefully argued throughout the litigation that the exams were "flawed" and may not have iden-
tified the most qualified candidates for the supervisory positions. See Brief for Respondents on 
the Merits at 28-36, Sec. III (C)(2)(b) Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) 
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over, after fonnulating a new legal rule, as the majority had done regard-
ing Title VII doctrine, the ordinary course would be a remand to apply 
it. 129 
Similarly, regarding the availability of less discriminatory alterna-
tives, the Court ruled that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to 
conclude: (1) that a different weighing of the composite score other than 
the 60% written to 40% oral fonnula would have included more black 
candidates without sacrificing merit; (2) that the "rule of three" could have 
been modified by rounding off the scores; and (3) that an assessment cen-
ter would have more accurately evaluated skills pertinent to the jobS. 130 
But again, on the incomplete and unsworn record, it is unclear how the 
Court could conclude that the plaintiffs negated all triable issues. 
The most extraordinary part of Justice Kennedy's opinion concerns 
the City'S potential future disparate-impact liability: 
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, 
then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would 
avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence 
that, had it not certified the results, it would have been subject to dispa-
rate-treatment liability. 131 
Remarkably, in a fit of judicial activism,132 the Court purports to rule 
against future minority plaintiffs should they file their disparate-impact 
("[ submitting] evidence that the tests were not job-related or consistent with business necessi-
ty"); Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 57-58, 62. 
But, as the City rested its defense in the district court primarily on a lack of intent to dis-
criminate-and as Professor Rutherglen acknowledges, "the city was understandably reluctant to 
submit evidence that the tests were invalid," Rutherglen, supra note 128, at lOl-it did not press 
the job-relation issue, but rather contended that the CSB could have found the exams invalid. See 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ricci v. DeStefano, 
No:3:04-CV-l109 (MRK), D. Conn., Nov. 4, 2005, at 5-9. 
129 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702. Having ordered summary judgment for the petitioners, the 
Court did remand the case, but for the sale purpose of sorting out the remedy questions. ld. at 
2681. See Part liLA. 
130 1d. at 2663. 
Ilild. at 2681. 
Il2 These are the same justices who, "on their own initiative, at the request of no party to 
the suit, declared that corporations and unions have a constitutional right to spend as much as 
they wish on television election commercials specifically supporting or targeting particular can-
didates." Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 
13,2010 (referring to Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). The Court first ordered 
the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the question of whether prior precedent going 
back decades, which permitted restrictions on campaign spending, should be discarded, see Citi-
zens United v. F.E.C , Powell v. Kelly,129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009), and then proceeded to do just 
that. 
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case. 133 Such a case, Briscoe v. City of New Haven, was filed and subse-
quently dismissed based on Ricci's mandate. 134 This preemptive strike 
against the non-party firefighters adversely impacted by the 2003 exami-
nations underscores the impropriety of finally resolving the Ricci case in 
their absence, as they no doubt would have made a more persuasive case 
for discarding the exam results than the City, which was constrained by its 
interest in protecting both its legal position and public image. 
C. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS 
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion that contemplated the ulti-
mate demise of disparate-impact liability, which in his mind the Court 
"merely postpones.,,135 He suggested that it is unconstitutional, as it "plac-
es a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the 
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because 
ot) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision-making is discrimi-
natory.,,136 Justice Ginsburg's dissent properly characterized this as a radi-
cal proposal, as the well-established and now codified Griggs principle 
merely instructs employers to use race-neutral and merit-based means in 
h . I I . 137 t elr personne se ectlons. 
Justice Alito, 138 joined by Scalia and Thomas, filed a separate concur-
ring opinion that responded to the dissent's purportedly "incomplete de-
scription of the events that led to New Haven's decision to reject the re-
133 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681. Justice Kennedy would have been well-advised to follow the 
dictate of Judge Guido Calabresi: "Difficult issues should be decided only when they must be 
decided, or when they are truly well presented. When they need not be decided ... it is wise to 
wait until they come up in a manner that helps, rather than hinders, clarity of thought." Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88,89 (2d Cir. 2008). 
134 2010 WL 2794212 (D. Conn. 2010); see also infra Part II1.B, for further discussion. 
135 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
136 I d. at 2682. Scalia asserted at oral argument that the disparate-treatment and disparate-
impact provisions "are at war with one another." Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 29. Other less 
dramatic commentators referred to "the uneasy relationship between the two principal theories 
ofliability under that statute." See Rutherglen, supra note 128, at 84. 
137 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
138 Samuel Alito was a member of Concerned Alumni of Princeton, whose mission was to 
oppose co-education and affirmative action for minorities, keeping the university a white male 
enclave. See Chanakya Sethi, Alita '72 Joined Conservative Alumni Group, THE DAILY 
PRINCETONIAN, Nov. 18,2005, available at http://www.dailyprincetonian.coml2005/11118/1387 
6/. Had this group's views prevailed, Sonia Sotomayor would not have been permitted to attend 
Princeton, as she would have lacked two requisites for admission. 
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sults of its exam.,,139 As he portrays it, the City's reason for scrapping the 
test results-concern about potential disparate-impact liability-was a 
pretext for its real reason: City officials conspired to sabotage the selection 
process to curry favor with influential leaders in the black community.140 
But if Alito's tale is accurate, it does not resolve the case, as it makes the 
City's decision not racially, but politically motivated. As Justice Ginsburg 
points out, "That political officials would have politics in mind is hardly 
extraordinary, and there are many ways in which a politician can attempt 
to win over a constituency-including a racial constituency-without en-
gaging in unlawful discrimination.,,141 
D. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, ex-
pressed sympathy for the white high-scorer plaintiffs, but concluded that 
"they had no vested right to promotion.,,142 "The legitimacy of an em-
ployee's expectations depends on the legitimacy of the selection me-
thod.,,143 She argued that the City properly concluded that its process 
failed to identify the most qualified applicants "and needlessly [shut] out a 
segment ofthe applicant pool.,,144 
The dissenters disputed the factual premise underlying the Court's 
decision-that the City rejected the test results solely because they pro-
duced only white promotions. 145 They argued that this premise, "essential 
to the Court's disposition, ignores substantial evidence of multiple flaws 
in the tests New Haven used.,,146 The dissenters further asserted that the 
"Court similarly fails to acknowledge the better tests used in other cities, 
which have yielded less racially skewed outcomes.,,147 An employer who 
disavows a selection device because it produced discriminatory results and 
is not a valid predictor of job performance is not, in their view, acting "be-
cause of race" in violation of Title VII.148 
139 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, 1., concurring). 
140 1d. 
141 ld. at 2709 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
142 ld. at 2690. 
143 ld. at 2702 (alteration in original). 
144 1d. (alteration in original). 
145 ld. at 2690. 
146 1d. 
147 ld. 
148 1d. at 2699. 
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Perhaps most significantly, Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority's 
view that the Civil Rights Act is at war with itself: 
Neither Congress' enactments nor this Court's Title VII precedents offer 
even a hint of "conflict" between an employer's obligations under the 
statute's disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. Standing 
on an equal footing, these twin pillars of Title VII advance the same ob-
jectives: ending workplace discrimination and promoting genuinely 
I . 149 equa opportumty. 
The dissenters recognized that the disparate-impact principle must 
not be cast aside, as it is central to enforcing Title VII.150 Moreover, vo-
luntary compliance had been a "dominant Title VII theme" since its 
enactment, and the Court's undefined strong-basis-in-evidence standard 
renders such compliance a "hazardous venture.,,151 
While the majority begins its Ricci narrative in 2003, Justice Gins-
burg goes back to the 1970s when fire departments around the country, in-
cluding New Haven's, "pervasively discriminated against minorities.,,152 
The story includes numerous cases in which hiring and promotional ex-
aminations for firefighters were found to be both discriminatory and not 
job-related. 153 She recites the long history of racial exclusion as well as the 
contemporary underrepresentation of minorities in fire departments, par-
ticularly in supervisory ranks, because "[i]t is against this backdrop of en-
trenched inequality that the promotion process at issue in this litigation 
should be assessed.,,154 
The City's CSB therefore reacted appropriately to the stark racial 
disparities in the exam results by questioning whether the tests accurately 
measured the qualities necessary to successfully perform as captains and 
lieutenants, and whether there were better alternatives to avoid disparate 
racial impact. 155 The City's Director of Personnel advised on these points 
that the exams "appear to test a candidate's ability to memorize textbooks 
but not necessarily to identify solutions to real problems on the fire 
ground." I 56 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 2690. 
151 Id. at 2700-01. 
152 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690. 
153 Id. at 2698 .. 
154 Id. at 2691 (alteration in original). 
155 Id. at 2692. 
156 Id. at 2695. 
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Ginsburg emphasized that during its hearings, the CSB heard evi-
dence not just of statistical disparities, but of the perpetuation of past ex-
clusionary practices. 157 For example, white candidates were far more like-
ly to have relatives already in the fire service from whom they could 
obtain materials and assistance, such as informal mentoring, which was 
unavailable to minorities as they were generally "first-generation firefight-
ers.,,158 The CSB also took account of evidence of the practices in nearby 
cities that had experienced similar racial disparities, but successfully 
switched to more performance-predictive devices with less discriminatory 
effect. 159 There was "cogent testimony [that] raised substantial doubts 
about the [NHFD] exam's reliability.,,16o 
Justice Ginsburg, reading from the bench, concluded: 
It is indeed regrettable that the City'S non-certification decision would 
have required all candidates to go through another selection process. But 
it would have been more regrettable to rely on flawed exams to shut out 
candidates who may well have the command presence and other qualities 
needed to excel as fire officers. Yet that is the choice the Court makes 
today. It is a choice that breaks the promise of Griggs that groups long 
denied equal opportunity would not be held back by tests "fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation.,,161 
III. THE PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES AND CONSEQUENT 
AFTERMATH OF RICCI 
One need not be a civil procedure teacher to be struck by two stark 
oddities of the Ricci decision: the Court's order granting, without remand, 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the anticipatory foreclosure of 
future cases that may be filed by non-party minority firefighters. 
A. THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Given the record before it, the Supreme Court's peremptory resolu-
tion of the case in favor of the plaintiffs on a "quintessential question of 
fact,,162-namely, the City's motives in rejecting the civil service list-is 
157 ld at 2692-93. 
15S Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2693. 
159 ld at 2705. 
160 ld at 2708 (alteration in original). 
161 ld at 2710. 
162 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, 1., dissenting). 
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hard to fathom. The customary approach, after reversing a lower court's 
denial of a motion for summary judgment, would be to remand to the trial 
court for reconsideration based on the full record. 163 Instead, the Court or-
dered judgment for the plaintiffs, concluding that there were no triable is-
sues of material fact and that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law under the newly articulated standards for such Title VII cas-
es. 164 All that was left for the district court, then, was to order promotion 
of the eligible plaintiffs, which it ultimately did (as discussed below). 165 
In granting the City's original motion for summary judgment on the 
disparate-treatment claim,166 the district court had applied the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,167 and found 
that the City had rebutted the plaintiffs' prima facie case that its action 
was racially motivated by proffering the legitimate reason that it was taken 
in good faith l68 to avoid the disparate impact against black candidates that 
would flow from rank-ordered appointment from the eligibility list. 169 
Given that the racial impact of the exams, in both pass-rates and resulting 
appointments, violated the applicable EEOC Guidelines,170 and that the 
evidence before the CSB raised serious questions about the predictive va-
lidity of the exams as well as the existence of alternative selection proce-
dures with less discriminatory effect, the district judge discerned no evi-
dence that the City's explanation was pretextual, and thus ruled for the 
City.171 
Even if the district court's legal analysis here was sound, however, 
163 Remand was the route the Obama Justice Department advocated. See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 
2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
164 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
165 Left unaddressed was the matter of plaintiffs' claim for damages, for which either party 
may opt for jury trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 note, Sec. 102(3)(c) 
(2006). 
166 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
167 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
168 Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, contending that good faith was not a 
defense here, was denied by the district court. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. 
Conn. 2006). 
169 1d. at 152. 
170 The City's requests for admissions regarding the adverse impact of the examinations 
and the existence of less discriminatory alternatives, served on the plaintiffs and not responded 
to, thereby conclusively established them as facts. See FED. R. Clv. P. 36(a)(3); Ricci, 554 F. 
Supp. 2d at 153. 
171 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
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there is a problem with the record supporting either of the cross motions. 
That record consisted primarilyl72 of the transcript of the non-adversarial 
CSB hearings, in which the testimony was unsworn, many voices were un-
identified, and much of it is described as "indiscernible."l73 One testing 
expert even "testified" on a speakerphone connection. 174 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires submission of "facts 
that would be admissible in evidence.,,175 The notion is to determine 
whether, given the record evidence, a reasonable jury could find for the 
party moved against; if not, summary judgment is appropriate. 176 Accor-
dingly, unsworn or otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, may 
not be used to support or oppose such a motion.177 The record in Ricci, 
both at the district court and Supreme Court levels, appears to lack the 
"evidentiary materials" required to support summary judgment for either 
party. 178 
Recognizing the problem, the district judge explained: 
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Hornick's non-sworn, hearsay statement at the 
172 Both sides submitted discovery materials and affidavits, but they did not contain data 
pertinent to the questions of job relation and validity. See Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
173 See, e.g., Joint App., supra note 53, at 22,23,26,29. 
174 Joint App., supra note 53, at 85-107. 
175 "Supporting or opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts 
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the 
matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is referred to in an affidavit, a sworn or certified copy 
must be attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit an affidavit to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or additional affidavits." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e). By amendment, which took effect on December 1,2010, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) 
provides that "a party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be 
presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Id. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("[Determination on remand is 1 whether such a showing, if reduced to 
admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof at trial."). "The 
court may consider any material that would be admissible or usable at trial." CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2721 (3d ed. 1998) (emphasis added). 
176 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
m See Addickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, n.16, 17, 19 (1970) (unsworn state-
ments do not meet the requirements of FED. R. CIY. P. 56(e»; Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 
948 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1991) (unsworn letter from expert is not proper); Setterlund v. Pot-
ter, 597 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172 (D. Mass. 2008) (unsworn witness statements may not be used); 
Watts v. Kroger Co., 955 F. Supp. 674, 677-78 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (since plaintiffs statement 
would be inadmissible at trial as improper lay opinion, it may not be used on a summary judg-
ment motion). 
17X Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Indeed, the Ricci plaintiffs themselves acknowledged the in-
adequacy of the record when they took issue with the characterization that witnesses "testified" 
at the CSB. See Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(I) Statement, ~~ 44, 46, 
48-50. 
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CSB hearing is inadmissible as non-disclosed expert evidence. Plaintiffs' 
argument is rejected because defendants proffer Dr. Hornick's not for the 
truth of his conclusion that the tests had a racially disparate impact, but 
to show that defendants had a good faith belief, based in part on Dr. 
Hornick's testimony, that such a disparate impact existed and justified 
h d .. 'f h 179 t e eClslOn not to certl y t e exams. 
While it is true that an employer need not be right about its stated 
reason for the challenged personnel decision, but must simply have a good 
faith belief in it, in order to prevail on a disparate-treatment claim, 180 
Judge Arterton's minimization of the hearsay problem seems too dismis-
sive. And if the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
defendants, the Supreme Court similarly had no basis for ordering sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs on the very same deficient record. 
In any event, granting summary judgment at the Supreme Court level 
is highly irregular. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, for example, having re-
versed the denial of summary judgment for the defendant, the Court re-
manded the motion, deeming the lower court "better suited than we are to 
make these determinations in the first instance.,,181 When the circuit court 
then held that summary judgment was inappropriate, it reserved decision 
on "whether this action must go to trial or whether, to the contrary, the 
case could be disposed of on summary judgment on the basis of a more 
fully developed record.,,182 
To grant summary judgment to the Ricci plaintiffs, the Court must 
have found that they had carried their burden of showing that the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in 
the record did not raise a single genuine issue of material fact for trial. 183 
This was clearly not the case. Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg protested, the 
maj ority short-circuited the litigation and "stack[ ed] the deck further by 
denying [the City] any chance to satisfy the newly announced strong-
basis-in-evidence standard. When this Court formulates a new legal rule, 
179 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148 n.4 (2006). 
180 See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183,207 (1997). 
181 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
182 Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
183 Cj Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994) (genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether promotions were made pursuant to narrowly tailored remedy precluded 
summary judgment for City). 
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the ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to apply the 
rule in the first instance.,,184 
Therefore, at the least, the Supreme Court should have remanded for 
further evidentiary proceedings. Had it done so, it is unlikely that the low-
er court would have granted either of the cross-motions, given the disa-
greements among the experts on test validity and lesser discriminatory al-
ternatives. Indeed, there were any number of genuine issues of material 
fact in dispute requiring trial. Instead, by ordering judgment for the plain-
tiffs, the remand simply became an exercise in parceling out the goodies. 
The Supreme Court's direction that the plaintiffs were "entitled to 
summary judgment on their Title VII claims,,185 led Judge Arterton to is-
sue an order on November 24, 2009, directing entry of judgment against 
the City on the disparate-treatment claim. 186 The order required that the 
CSB certify the results of the 2003 promotional exams, and the promotion 
of fourteen of the named plaintiffs. 187 The following month, the City opted 
to promote twenty-four firefighters in rank-order from the original lists, 
including the fourteen Ricci plaintiffs-thirteen white and one Hispanic-
as well as three blacks and two Latinos who were not involved in the 
case. 188 
Eight black firefighters led by Gary Tinney (head of the Firebirds, an 
association of black professional firefighters) sought, unsuccessfully, to 
intervene to halt the promotions. 189 In opposing the motion, the City ar-
184 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658. 2702 (2009) (alteration in original). 
185 Id at 2681. 
186 William Kaempffer, Judge Orders New Haven to Promote Firefighters, NEW HAYEN 
REG., Nov. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/20091l1l24/news/new_ 
havenldoc4bOc7f632b093927209424.txt. 
187 Id 
188 William Kaempffer, New Haven Fire Board Approves Long-Sought Promotions, NEW 
HAYEN REG., Dec. I, 2009, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2009/12/0Ilnews 
Idoc4bI57Ief3blb9626869946.txt. The ten promoted who were not original Ricci plaintiffs 
were required to sign a waiver promising not to sue the City or seek back payor constructive 
seniority, even though several, including the second and third highest scorers, outscored some of 
the plaintiffs (Frank Ricci was sixth on the lieutenant's eligibility list) who were promoted and 
awarded constructive seniority, and are further seeking back pay, compensatory, and punitive 
damages from the City. See Thomas Macmillan, IO More Firefighters Promoted, NEW HAYEN 
REG., Dec. 4, 2009, available at http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry 
1l0_morejirefightersjlromotedl. Six original Ricci plaintiffs who either failed the test or scored 
too low to be promoted also sought promotions in the remand proceedings, to no avail. Tele-
phone Interview With Victor A. Bolden, supra note 68. 
189 Thomas Macmillan, Ricci Case "Tinney Intervenors" Try Again, NEW HAYEN INDEP., 
Dec. 8,2009, available at http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entryIricci_ 
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gued it was untimely.190 Karen Torre, lawyer for the Ricci plaintiffs, took 
the opportunity to personally attack Tinney for using "his race and racial 
rhetoric to escape the consequences of his exam perfonnance.,,191 
B. THE FORECLOSURE OF FUTURE CASES 
It is axiomatic, as a matter of both constitutional due process and the 
finality doctrine, that there can be no claim preclusion against non-parties 
not in privity with parties to the original case, and no issue preclusion on 
matters not actually litigated and detennined by the judgment. 192 A un-
animous Supreme Court recently reaffinned this "deep-rooted historic tra-
dition that everyone should have his [or her] own day in court.,,193 None-
theless, as noted above, Justice Kennedy pre-detennined any future action 
alleging disparate impact arising from the 2003 NHFD exam administra-
tion. 
Michael Briscoe, a black firefighter who took the 2003 lieutenant's 
exam but did not participate in the Ricci litigation, brought such an action 
against the City in October, 2009. 194 Specifically, he challenged the 60% 
written to 40% percent oral weighting of the exam components. 195 Had the 
oral portion counted 70%, as in some other public safety agencies, Bris-
coe, who scored the highest of all seventy-seven candidates, would likely 
have been promoted, along with two other black firefighters. 196 His written 
score, however, brought him down to twenty-fourth on the list. 197 
Briscoe claimed that this constituted disparate impact, pointing out 
that black candidates, as a group, perfonned substantially better on the 
cases _ tinney jntervenors _ try_again! 
190 Id. 
191 Id. It is particularly ironic that Ms. Torre, who argued that intervention by the black 
firefighters was untimely, at the same time successfully argued for the intervention of white of-
ficers opposing remedial relief to minorities in a case filed twenty-five years bejhre. See Bridge-
port Guardians v. Delmonte, 602 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2010). 
192 See Stephen N. Subrin, Martha L. Minow, Mark S. Brodin, & Thomas O. Main, Civil 
Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Context 879-89 (3d ed. 2008). 
193 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (rejecting the doctrine of preclu-
sion based on virtual representation). A decision of the Court certainly has stare decisis effect on 
future litigation involving non-parties, based on principles of law, but that is a far cry from fo-
reclosing their litigation entirely. 
194 Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 2010 WL 2794212 (D. Conn. 2010). 
195 Id. at 3. 
196 /d. 
197 Id. 
2011] RICCI V DESTEFANO 189 
oral exam than their white counterparts, and that the oral component was 
much more closely related to the duties of a fire officer. l98 Two Ricci 
plaintiffs moved to intervene to oppose Briscoe's claims. '99 
The City moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Title VII claim 
was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision, and U.S. District Judge 
Haight reluctantly agreed.2oo Closing the Catch-22 circle, he concluded: 
The Supreme Court having declined to remand the case for further evi-
dentiary proceedings regarding disparate impact, Briscoe cannot circum-
vent that decision by filing another lawsuit with respect to the same ex-
ams to attempt to create the record that would otherwise have been made 
upon remand.2ol 
With obvious understatement, the judge acknowledged that "the 
weighting issue ... does not appear to have been a primary focus of the 
litigation.,,202 Indeed, all Justice Kennedy says about it is that the City 
produced no evidence to show that the written to oral split was arbitrary or 
non-job-related.203 The Ricci plaintiffs of course fully supported the validi-
ty of the entire selection process that served them so well, and the City si-
milarly had no incentive to challenge this provision of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.204 Judge Haight further acknowledged that there was 
no opportunity to litigate this matter on the peremptory remand of Ricci.2oS 
Nonetheless, while he credits Briscoe's due process/day-in-court 
plea, Judge Haight concluded it is trumped: 
Briscoe argues that it is unfair to apply Ricci to foreclose his case, citing 
cases for the familiar propositions that one is not bound by the decision 
in a case to which he was not a party, and that everyone deserves his own 
day in court. However, this argument, while appealing and true as far as 
it goes, does not survive analysis when viewed in light of the fact that the 
Supreme Court in Ricci specifically anticipated and explicitly foreclosed 
subsequent disparate impact suits, such as Briscoe's, against the City 
based on the 2003 exams. The Court concluded that based upon the 
record before it, no strong basis in evidence had been established to sup-
198 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, ~~ 5, 8, Briscoe v. New Haven, 2010 
WL 2794212 (D. Conn. 2010), No. 3:09-cv-01642 (CSH) (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2009). 
199 Briscoe, 2010 WL 2794212, at *8. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. at 7. 
202 [d. at 19. 
203 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658,2679 (2009). 
204 See Briscoe, 2010 WL 2794212, at *23-24. 
205 [d. at 7. 
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port the City's decision to throw out the exams because of disparate im-
pact. And the Court precluded any further expansion of that record, ei-
ther on remand in Ricci or in some subsequent disparate impact suit such 
as Briscoe's. If, as he contends, Briscoe is denied his day in court or is 
bound by a decision in a case to which he was not a party, it is because 
the Supreme Court decided as much, and this court is bound by the deci-
sions of the high court. 206 
Thus ended the final chapter of what Justice Ginsburg described as a 
"stacking of the deck,,207 against the black firefighters seeking promotion 
in New Haven.208 A non-party to Ricci, whose interests were not remotely 
represented by any party, was foreclosed from litigating issues that were 
not litigated in that case. Surely any first-year law student will be per-
plexed at this result, as it confers binding application to pure dicta regard-
206 Jd. at 8 (emphasis added). Judge Haight suggests that Briscoe should have intervened 
at the outset of the original litigation in 2004. Jd. at 9. But see Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 
2010 WL 2794231, at *2 (D. Conn. 2010) (acknowledging that the City did not disclose any test 
scores until after the Supreme Court's decision in June 2009). 
207 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702. 
208 The whipsawing of the black firefighters stands in sharp contrast to the Supreme 
Court's warm welcome years earlier to white firefighters contesting an affirmative action decree 
in Birmingham, Alabama. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the white plaintiffs could collaterally attack the decree 
entered in the earlier case even though they had failed to intervene, relying on the fundamental 
proposition explicitly ignored in Briscoe, i.e., that one is not bound by a judgment entered in 
their absence. Id. Martin v. Wilks puts the burden on "plaintiffs who seek the aid of the courts to 
alter existing employment policies" to identify and join all those who would be adversely af-
fected if plaintiffs prevail. Id. at 767. See also Bridgeport Guardians v. Delmonte, 602 F.3d 469 
(2d Cir. 2010) (allowing white officers to intervene to challenge the remedial order in a twenty-
five-year-old race discrimination suit). 
Martin v. Wilks, together with several other decisions during that Term, prompted Con-
gress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which among other things forecloses challenges to 
litigated or consent judgments by persons who had notice that the proposed judgment might ad-
versely affect them and had an opportunity to present objections, or were adequately represented 
by a party on the same legal grounds. See Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 
1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment olthe Second Re-
construction," 31 B.C. L. REV. I (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006). 
These conditions do not apply to the Briscoe litigation, as neither the City nor the plain-
tiffs could be deemed to have represented his interest in challenging the weighting of the com-
ponents. See Briscoe, 2010 WL 2794212. Moreover, Briscoe alleged the City knew or should 
have known, based on past experience, that the 60% written to 40% oral split would harm black 
applicants, a claim that no party raised in the original case. Id. And neither the nature of the orig-
inal Ricci action, nor its summary disposition, provided Briscoe with the kind of notice contem-
plated by §2000e-2(n), especially since the City refused to disclose test scores to applicants until 
after proceedings concluded. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Briscoe v. City of New Ha-
ven, 2010 WL 2794212 (2d Cir. 2010); Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 2010 WL 2794231 (D. 
Conn. 2010). 
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ing a hypothetical future case. 
IV. WHAT IS LEFT OF TITLE VII? 
Just as its predecessor significantly increased the burden of proving 
traditional (i.e., with minority or female plaintiffs) Title VII disparate-
treatment cases,209 the Roberts Court has now constrained the disparate-
impact prohibition. What Justice Scalia would do directly, as he suggests 
in his Ricci concurrence,210 Justice Kennedy accomplishes by characteriz-
ing employer action to avoid disparate impact as itself unlawful, race-
conscious discrimination.211 
The Court fails to acknowledge that the disparate-impact provisions 
of Title VII are, and always have been, necessarily race-conscious, as they 
"require an employer to be aware of the race of individual applicants when 
adopting selection procedures and, in fact, to consider race if the selection 
procedure ultimately results in a racially disparate impact.,,212 Since first 
recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,213 which involved intelligence 
tests and a high school diploma requirement, the impact principle has been 
Title VII's primary regulatory mechanism to remove unnecessary (i.e., 
non-merit) barriers to minority and female employment,214 including writ-
209 See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, supra 
note 180. 
210 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-83. Inexplicably, just a month after Ricci was decided, Justice 
Scalia authored an opinion for a unanimous Court ruling that black firefighter applicants could 
challenge Chicago's use of an arbitrary cut-off score for its written test, notwithstanding the Se-
venth Circuit's conclusion that the disparate-impact challenge was untimely because it was not 
filed within 300 days of sorting the scores. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). In 
concluding that there was a continuing violation as long as candidates were certified from the 
civil service list, Justice Scalia offers a solitary, perfunctory cite to Ricci. Id. at 2197-98. He 
recites the history of Griggs and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with nary a mention of his dire 
prediction of impact's demise just weeks before. [d. at 2197. Adding to the irony, Scalia writes: 
"It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve 
what we think Congress really intended." Id. at 2200. Judge Haight, sorting out the aftermath of 
Ricci, concluded that Lewis, as a timeliness case, does not modify Ricci "in any way." Briscoe v. 
City of New Haven, 2010 WL 2794231, at *4 (D. Conn. 2010). 
211 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675. 
212 Brief for the New York Law School Racial Justice Project as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 20, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). See also 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 11, Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
213 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
214 See generally Stryker, supra note 99, at 14,24 (describing impact theory as "an ag-
gressive enforcement strategy" and noting that "disparate impact is widely credited with promot-
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ten tests,215 height-weight minimums,216 degree requirements,217 and arrest 
and conviction records?18 
The targets of disparate-impact analysis are selection procedures that 
disproportionately exclude minorities or females and cannot be demon-
strated to be significantly related to job performance. The impact prohibi-
tion, as codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,219 thus wisely insists that 
personnel decisions be made on a merit and non-discriminatory basis, fo-
cusing on the qualifications and skills necessary to successfully perform 
the position at issue.22o Chief Justice Burger221 wrote for the unammous 
Griggs Court: 
ing wholesale change in employment practices."); Mark S. Brodin, Costs. Profits, and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318 (1987). 
215 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 451 (1982) (,,[Title VII guarantees each individual] the opportunity to compete equally with 
white workers on the basis of job-related criteria."). 
216 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
217 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433. 
218 Green v. Mo.-Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th CiT. 1975); see also Sam Hananel, 
Job-Screening Tactics Draw Critics, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2010, at B8 (EEOC warns that 
screening candidates based on criminal records or credit problems "can be illegal if it has a dis-
parate impact on racial minorities," who are statistically more likely to be incarcerated and have 
poor credit histories). 
219 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105,42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
220 Thus, descriptions of impact doctrine as requiring quota hiring, such as that of Profes-
sor Richard Primus-"Title VII's disparate impact doctrine ... requires employers and public 
officials to classify the workforce into racial categories and then allocate social goods on the 
basis of that c1assification"-are as inaccurate as they are bizarre. See Richard Primus, The Fu-
ture a/Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010); see also Rutherglen, supra note 128, 
at 85 (asserting that New Haven took away the benefits of the exams from the white passers and 
"redistributed" them to minorities who failed). 
Primus acknowledges that quotas are not part of the judicial remedies for an impact viola-
tion, which only include prospective injunctive relief to end the practice, back pay, and other 
monetary relief. Primus, supra note 115, at 1374. He is instead invoking the "parade of horrors" 
that almost derailed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, namely that employers will preemptively en-
gage in quota practices in response to the risk of disparate-impact liability. See Stryker, supra 
note 99, at 14 (opponents of the biJI "kept up a constant 'drumbeat' of quotas," and President 
George H.W. Bush vetoed an earlier version as a "quota" bill). 
That such fear is misplaced is underscored by the Court's resolution of Connecticut v. 
Teal, in which the Connecticut agency sought to compensate for the adverse impact of a civil 
service exam by affirmatively promoting minority candidates lower on the eligibility list. Con-
necticut v. Teal. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The decision rejects such a preemptive "bottom-line" de-
fense, and requires that each step in the selection process be free of disparate impact. Id. 
221 Justice Burger was appointed by Rcpublican President Richard M. Nixon. John Fox, 
Biographies of the Robes: Warren Earl Burger, PBS (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.pbs.orglwnet/supremecourt/rights/robes_burger.html. 
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[The goal of Title VII] was to achieve equality of employment opportun-
ities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identi-
fiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, 
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in 
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the sta-
tus quo of prior discriminatory employment practices . 
. . . What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invi-
diously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible clas-
sification. 222 
193 
Griggs simply acknowledged what is conventional wisdom among 
civil rights lawyers, sociologists, and labor market observers, namely that 
"[i]nstitutionalized practices often perpetuate discriminatory patterns es-
tablished in the past even when race or gender animus is absen1.,,223 
Courts that addressed the issue before Ricci uniformly held that cor-
rective measures to avoid disparate impact against minorities or women do 
not constitute intentional discrimination against white males. In Hayden v. 
County of Nassau,224 the Second Circuit dismissed a challenge by white and Latino 
applicants to the Nassau County police department's reconfiguration of its 
entrance examination, which was designed to minimize its discriminatory 
impact on minority candidates: 
Nothing suggests that the County sought to disadvantage appellants, or 
that the County was propelled by sinister or invidious motivations. A de-
sire to reduce the adverse impact on black applicants and rectify hiring 
practices which the County admitted in the 1982 consent order225 might 
222 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31 (alteration in original). As New Haven Corporation Coun-
sel Victor Bolden explained: "No one debates that a high school diploma is not a worthy thing to 
have, but in the particular context of [the unskilled jobs at Duke's power plant], it was excluding 
African Americans and the job it was excluding them from, you did not need a high school dip-
loma to actually perform those tasks." Telephone Interview with Victor A. Bolden, supra note 
68 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the consequence of imposing the diploma and test requirements was to effec-
tively maintain the same segregated workforce at Duke Power that was in place before Title VII 
took effect on July 5, 1965. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428-29. Therein lies another importance of 
preserving the disparate-impact dimension of Title VII in full force: it prevents the easy circum-
vention of Title VII by clever imposition of "neutral" or "objective" devices. 
223 Stryker, supra note 99, at IS. 
224 Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999). 
225 The New Haven Fire Department entered into the same kind of consent decree in 1975, 
including an agreement to revise its promotional practices. See Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, 
Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975), aiI'd SIS F.2d 504 (2d 
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support an inference of discrimination is not analogous to an intent to 
discriminate against non-minority candidates. As the district court so apt-
ly phrased it: "where an exam that discriminates against a group or 
groups of persons is reviewed, studied and changed in order to eliminate, 
or at the very least, alleviate such discrimination, there is a complete ab-
sence of intentional discrimination." 
Appellants' position would have us equate the County's desire to elimi-
nate the discriminatory impact of its hiring practices on minority appli-
cants with an intent to discriminate against Appellants. To so find could 
seriously stifle attempts to remedy discrimination. If employers or go-
vernmental entities fear that they will be charged with discriminating 
against non-minorities, they will shy away from all proper efforts to rec-
tify prior discrimination. 226 
As Justice Souter observed during oral argument in Ricci, whatever 
Congress wanted to attain by codifying the disparate impact-principle, it 
could not have wanted a "damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't situa-
tion," in which the City would face a disparate-impact case if it went for-
ward with the results of the exams, and a disparate-treatment case if it did 
no1.227 Rather, as Justice Ginsburg reads them, the statute's disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact provisions are "twin pillars" in the effort to 
achieve workplace equality.228 Justice Souter also criticized the Ricci 
plaintiffs' position, (ultimately adopted by the majority and a central tenet 
of Roberts Court dogma), that "make [ s] no distinction between race as an 
animating discriminating object on the one hand and race consciousness 
[to remedy the defects in the exams] on the other. ,,229 
The City did not manipulate the 2003 test scores or promote lower-
scoring black candidates.23o It merely invalidated the entire process to start 
Cir. 1975) (motion of white firefighters to intervene after entry of consent decree denied). 
226 Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51. See also Byers v. City of Albuquerque. 150 F.3d 1271, 1275-
76 (lOth Cir. 1998) (lowering of the written test score needed to proceed to the next round of the 
selection process, by one point, to accommodate more non-white candidates is permitted). 
227 Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 8. Quoting the EEOC Guidelines, the Ricci dissenters 
observe that "[b]y the enactment of title VII, Congress did not intend to expose those who comp-
ly with the Act to charges that they are violating the very statute they are seeking to implement." 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2699 (2009) (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 
1608.1(a) (2008)). 
22R Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2699. 
229 Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 9 (alteration in original). 
230 See Brief for Respondents on the Merits at 2, Sec. III (C)(2)(b), Ricci v. DeStefano. 
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). There was thus no violation of the "race-norming" prohi-
bition in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l), which states that "[it] shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for 
2011] RICCI V DESTEFANO 195 
over with procedures more likely to produce qualified officers and less 
likely to exclude minorities. 231 The City's efforts were far from the rigid 
quota or set-aside approaches232 condemned in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke,233 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,234 Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,235 Gratz v. Bol/inger,236 and Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1.237 Nonetheless, the 
Ricci majority somehow equated the two situations, which jeopardizes the 
enforcement of the crucial disparate-impact principle.238 
employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise 
alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." ld. 
231 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661. Prior precedent permitted far more aggressive corrective ef-
forts on a showing of a conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories, without 
requiring the employer to prove its own violation of Title VII, as Justice Kennedy's opinion ef-
fectively demands. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (passing over a 
male to promote a female with lower test score pursuant to affirmative action plan); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,212 (1979) (affirmative action plan for on-the-job 
training, which mandated a one-for-one hiring quota for minority workers). See also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) ("strong basis in evidence" requirement 
is satisfied by evidence "approaching a prima facie case"). It was undisputed that such imbal-
ance existed within the supervisory ranks of the NHFD. See supra note 54. 
232 The Second Circuit judges in Ricci who voted against rehearing viewed the characteri-
zation of the City's action as resembling a quota to be "entirely mistaken." Ricci v. DeStefano, 
530 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2008). However, a very different tone was set at the Supreme Court 
when counsel for the petitioners opened oral argument with the characterization that "[ r ]acial 
classifications are inherently pernicious and, if not checked, lead as they did in New Haven to 
regrettable and socially destructive politics." Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 4. The Deputy So-
licitor General's persistent arguments that the case did not involve racial classification were si-
milarly given short shrift. See id. at 34-39. That the case actually involved avoiding exclusio-
nary impact, and not racial classification, was relegated to the dissent to explain. 
233 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (reserving certain medical 
school seats for minorities only). 
234 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (affording special protection to 
minorities against lay-off). 
235 Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (contract set-asides for minority 
bidders). 
236 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (awarding extra points in college admission 
process based on race of applicant). 
237 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701 (2007) (re-
liance upon race in student assignment plans to determine which public schools children could 
attend). 
m See Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 7, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
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V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION IN FIREFIGHTING 
For decades in the earlier part of the 20th century,[fire service] was 
strictly dominated by whites in all ranks and, like the military, tended to 
enjoy (particularly with ranking officers) a peculiar sense of "tradition, " 
of legacies and closed traditions of handling down fire careers from fa-
thers to sons. In the 1960s and 1970s, as more blacks attempted to gain 
entrance into the fire-fighting profession, numerous attempts were made 
to close ranks and keep them out. Racism in both hiring and promotion 
was rampant, as attested to by the numerous cases filed and consent 
judgments entered by courts during the late 1960s through the 1980s. 
These decrees had to take race into account to overcome the decades of 
racial discrimination and segregation, vestiges of which still linger in 
the fire service today. 
As the decrees have expired, the percentage of professional black fire-
fighters has drastically declined by nearly half . ... In 2008, only 8.2% 
were black, and of first-line supervisors, only 5.8% were black. 239 
When Title VII was extended to cover public employment in 1972, as 
Justice Ginsburg recalled in her dissent, "municipal fire departments 
across the country, including New Haven's, pervasively discriminated 
against minorities.,,24o While Justice Kennedy's Ricci opinion starts the 
narrative in Act III of the drama, the dissent put the dispute in the context 
of the ugly history of racial exclusion and intolerance in firehouses across 
the country in Acts I and 11.241 The omitted scenes include egregious in-
stances of harassment, threats, and violence against the few minorities 
who broke through the barriers and secured positions on fire depart-
ments.242 What makes the "mixing of the races" so much more volatile in 
fire fighting than in policing or other public employment positions is that 
firefighters share intimate quarters during their long shifts. 243 What in tum 
239 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, 27, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-
1428) (citing U.S. D.O.L. Bureau of Labor Statistics) (alteration in original). 
240 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009). 
241 See id. at 2665, 2703. 
242 See id. at 2590-91. 
243 U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, For All the People . .. By All the People: A Report on 
Equal Opportunity in State and Local Employment 88 (1969); Ossher, Brooks, & Robinson, su-
pra note 27, at 1 ("37 years after a court decree forced minority hiring, many units and firehous-
es [in Boston] are starkly and increasingly segregated. Old rules and city inaction have put hard-
2011] RICC] V DESTEF AND 197 
makes the situation of ostracized minorities so much more vulnerable is 
that fire crews depend critically on each other in order to survive. 
The case of De Grace v. Rumsjelcf44 is emblematic. The plaintiff, 
Bobby De Grace, was employed as the only African American among 
some forty civilian firefighters at the Naval Air Station at South Wey-
mouth, Massachusetts (NASSW) in the late 1970s.245 The trial court found 
the department was "infected with pervasive racism," which was blithely 
ignored by the authorities. 246 As a result, De Grace was terminated at the 
end of his probationary period, but reinstated after the Naval Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Examiner found that derogatory racial terms were 
routinely used to address him and that his supervisors were "coloured by 
hostility and racial prejudice.,,247 
Although the Examiner recommended that his fellow firefighters and 
supervisors be given training on racial sensitivity, De Grace's reinstate-
ment only exacerbated the situation?48 "Troubling events," as the First 
Circuit later put it, began to escalate.249 First, his safety equipment was 
damaged, including his crash helmet and survival knife.250 Then, De Grace 
was subjected to the "'silent treatment'" by his co-workers and supervi-
sors.251 On occasion, the crew would refuse to ride with him.252 Finally, he 
received three ominously threatening handwritten notes in his locker.253 
The first one read: "Hey boy get your Black ass out before you don't have 
one." The second note stated, "I don't want you sleeping in the same place 
as me. Your dirtier and smellier than a mud turtle, so why don't ya just 
take a hint and get the f[***] out you Black niger;" and the third, "Niger, 
If we end up having a fire, you'll be staying in it and getting a lot black-
er.,,254 The district court found that one or more of De Grace's co-workers 
won diversity gains in peril."). 
244 De Grace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F .2d 796 (I st Cir. 1980). The author was co-counsel for the 
plaintiff at trial and on appeal. 
245 Id. at 799 n.2. 
246 /d. at 799. 
247 !d. 
248/d. at 800. 
249/d. 
250 /d. 
251 /d. 
252 /d. 
253 /d. 
254 /d. 
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were responsible for the notes.255 
When, upon receipt of the last threat, he absented himself from the 
unit, De Grace was again terminated. 256 The First Circuit later ruled that 
his trepidation about returning was not "an unreasonable, aberrational re-
sponse to notes of such a tenor especially in light of firefighters' occupa-
tional situation where mutual dependency and cooperation is required for 
safe firefighting.,,257 It also found that NASSW's initial failings to correct 
the racially hostile work environment "may have paved the way for the in-
tensification of hostile relations which culminated with the threatening 
notes.,,258 On remand, the district court ultimately found that De Grace's 
absence was the reasonable response to pervasive racial hostility and phys-
ical threats, which his superiors culpably failed to even attempt to alle-
viate.259 
Such discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the Nation's 
fire departments is not a relic of the past. A 2009 federal district court de-
cision regarding the Camden, New Jersey fire department discloses a very 
similar pattern.260 As the first and only non-white at his fire station in the 
early 1980s, plaintiff Kevin Hailey was subjected to constant prejudicial 
treatment-restricted to sleeping in certain beds, ignored by his fellow 
firefighters, and referred to by racial epithets.z61 On several occasions his 
superiors abandoned him and he was left alone to fight fires.z62 
In 1989, Hailey was appointed as captain after scoring well on the 
exam, yet he continued to experience intolerance?63 Other firefighters 
openly claimed that Hailey benefitted from racial curving of exam scores, 
dubbing his rise "Hailey's Comet.,,264 He heard comments like "there is no 
way this nigger beat me on the test.,,265 He was criticized in front of his 
255 Id. 
256 ld. at 801. 
257 Id. at 804. 
25R Id. at 805 n.5. 
259 Findings, Rulings and Order for Judgment After Remand, De Grace v. Rumsfeld, 614 
F.2d 796 (1980) (No. 76-1205-S). 
260 Hailey v. City of Camden, 631 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D.N J. 2009). The jury verdict in favor 
of plaintiffs was upheld by the district court. Hailey v. City of Camden, 650 F. Supp. 2d 349 
(D.NJ.2009). 
261 Hailey, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
262 [d. 
263 [d. 
264 [do 
265 ld. 
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men by the Deputy Chief, thereby undermining his credibility.266 Then, 
after finishing second among more than fifty candidates on the test for bat-
talion chief and being appointed to that position in 1992, white firefighters 
routinely disregarded his orders at fire scenes, and the chiefs refused to 
discipline them. 267 The racial slurs persisted.268 Finally, rising to deputy 
chief in 2002, Hailey still found himself powerless despite his rank.269 On 
one occasion, white battalion chiefs tried to relieve him of command at a 
fire scene.270 
Co-plaintiff Terrence Crowder had similar experiences at another 
firehouse in Camden.271 Like Hailey, Crowder was relegated to "the black 
room" and was left alone at fire scenes.272 Superiors ignored Crowder's 
complaints.273 Indeed, when a Captain ordered Crowder, "[Nigger], mop 
the floor," Crowder himself ended up charged with "insubordination and 
conduct unbecoming a fire fighter.,,274 
In a similar vein, litigation revealed in 2006 that most of the black of-
ficers and firefighters in the Cleveland fire department worked in segre-
gated station houses pejoratively labeled "Monkey Islands.,,275 No black 
officers, and very few black firefighters, were assigned to houses on the 
west side of the city.276 Plaintiff Emmett Jordan was one of the few excep-
tions, and while assigned there his colleagues called him "Sambo" and 
"Welfare Firefighter," and subjected him to persistent offensive racial 
jokes and graffiti.277 Fellow firefighters tampered with and misplaced Jor-
dan's protective gear.278 The white firefighters erected a "Wall of Hate" to 
segregate the blacks, which remained in place until 1999.279 Jordan was 
shunned, demeaned, disproportionately disciplined, assigned menial 
266 Id. at 534. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
27° Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2006). 
276 1d. 
277 Id. at 592-93. 
27R Id. at 589. 
279 Id. 
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chores, and warned not to complain.280 White firefighters formed the 
"Caucasian American Firefighters Association" (and later changed the 
name to "Concerned American Firefighters Association") to oppose any 
affirmative action efforts?8! In addition, two white-only social networking 
clubs were deemed to provide the "fast track" to advancement within the 
Cleveland department. 282 
Racially demeaning comments from white colleagues and supervi-
sors, silent treatments, and the practice of assigning black firefighters to 
"black beds" and separate eating facilities, all remained commonplace in 
our Nation's firehouses until at least the late 1970s.283 As recently as 2010, 
an investigation of the Boston Fire Department found that a high degree of 
segregation still persists in the city's firehouses,284 and that the gains in 
minority hiring practices under prior civil rights consent decrees are now 
being turned back. 285 A long-standing "legacy" policy magnifies the un-
fairness by allowing Boston firefighters with relatives in the Department 
to choose their assignment, usually to the busiest and most elite venues, 
such as the marine unit.286 These career-enhancing benefits flow almost 
exclusively to the large percentage of white firefighters with family on the 
job.287 
280 1d. at 590. 
281 Id. at 589 n.5. 
282 Id. at 589. 
283 See Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412, 434--35 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, 1., dissenting) 
(segregation of black sleeping quarters, assignments, and breathing equipment continued until 
'1971, and segregated seating at meals until the late 1970s); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v, 
City of St. Louis, 549 F .2d 506, 513 (8th Cir. 1977) (exclusion of blacks from firehouse eating 
arrangements); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 959 F, Supp. 870, 874-75 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (se-
gregation of fire companies and trucks, assignment of white firefighters to black firehouses only 
as punishment, providing black firefighters with older equipment, unfairly scoring minorities 
below whites on efficiency evaluations); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 
1194 (D. Md. 1973) (segregation of department facilities, "black beds," and atmosphere of ha-
rassment and ostracism through the late I 960s led to high attrition rate). See also Ass'n Against 
Discrimination in Emp't, Inc, v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1979) (perva-
sive policy of discrimination against black and Hispanic applicants for fire department). 
284 Ossher, Brooks, & Robinson, supra note 27, at I, 8. The firehouse in the heart of the 
black community is staffed by forty-six firefighters, only seven of whom are non-white. It is 
derisively dubbed "Fort Dudley" and keeps its doors closed to the neighborhood. The elite Ma-
rine Unit in the harbor has no non-white members, and the Fire Academy has only one minority 
on staff. Id. 
285 Id. at 1. The civil service preferences for military veterans and for firefighters laid off 
from other departments overwhelmingly benefits white applicants. Id. at 8. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
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In short, black firefighters around the country may still find them-
selves in separate and starkly unequal work environments.28B 
The New Haven Fire Department is no exception to this unfortunate 
history. Discrimination litigation dates back to at least 1973, at which 
point the Department had no Hispanics and only 18 blacks among its 502 
men. 289 Only 1 black firefighter held a supervisory position among the 107 
officers.29o A consent decree was entered regarding hiring and promotional 
practices, containing the Department's agreement to validate the tests used 
for promotion.291 The decree was unsuccessfully challenged by white of-
ficers who claimed, like the Ricci plaintiffs, that they merely sought to 
"preserve a system of promotions based upon merit and not considerations 
of race. ,,292 
That was the first of several race discrimination cases filed over the 
course of the next thirty years?93 As Superior Court Judge Lynda B. Mu-
nro noted with frustration in 2002, it had been "over 20 years [since] the 
hiring and promotional practices of the City of New Haven Fire Depart-
ment have been under judicial scrutiny. The City has come up wanting on 
now a third occasion.,,294 Judge Munro appointed a special master to over-
see promotions in the Department, but violations still persisted.295 As of 
2007, the NHFD employed only 99 blacks among 359 uniformed person-
2SS It should also be noted that black firefighters in many departments have been denied 
the valuable opportunity to "act up" to officers' positions when a vacancy occurs, or to serve 
"acting time" to fill in for a shift commander. See, e.g., Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 
584,591 (6th Cir. 2006); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 959 F. Supp. 870,875 (N.D. III. 1997). 
2S9 See Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 
457 (D. Conn. 1975), afJ'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (motion of white firefighters to inter-
vene after entry of consent decree denied). 
290 fd. at 460 
291 !d. at 462. 
292 fd. at 463. Although ostensibly seeking strict compliance with civil service provisions, 
white New Haven firefighters advocated manipulation of those very provisions when it served 
their own interests. See, e.g., New Haven Firebird Socy'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 593 A.2d 
1383 (Conn. 1991) (successful challenge by black firefighters to the practice of "stockpiling," 
making promotions from an expiring eligibility list even though there were no actual vacancies), 
ajJ'd, 630 A.2d 131 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 2002 WL 449712 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2002) (enjoining promotional practice of "underfilling," which dis-
proportionately favored whites), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 851 A.2d 1113 (Conn. 2004). 
293 See Broadnax, 2002 WL 449712, at *14. 
294 fd. (alteration in original). 
295 Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 2003 WL 21805808, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 25, 
2003), rev'd, 851 A.2d 1113 (Conn. 2004). 
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nel, and only 13 among its 82 officers. 296 This in a city with a population 
that is 40% black and more than 20% Hispanic.297 
The Ricci majority on the Court preferred to ignore the historical con-
text of the matter before them. 
VI. THE CULTURE OF TESTING, THE TEST GAP, EMPLOYMENT 
TESTS, AND THE NEW HAVEN EXPERIENCE 
I've spoken to at least 10, 000, maybe 15, 000 firefighters in group set-
tings in my consulting practice and I have never one time ever had any-
one in the fire service say to me, "Well, the person who answers~gets 
the highest score on a written job knowledge, multiple-guess test makes 
the best company officer. " We know that it's not as valid as other proce-
dures that exist. 298 
Tests that transform differences that are as likely to be a product of mea-
surement error or flawed test design as they are a reflection of superior 
qualifications create nothing but the illusion of meritocracy. That illu-
sion creates not only a false sense of individual entitlement to jobs and 
promotions, but also a real public danger in the context of positions such 
as fire and police officers. When the safety and lives of citizens are at 
stake, it is particularly critical for public employers to have the leeway 
to ensure that the tests they deploy accurately identifY those candidates 
who are most qualified for these important jobs. 299 
It is no revelation that our society is obsessed with standardized 
tests-it is only a slight exaggeration to call it continuous testing from the 
cradle to the grave.300 But we should pause to ponder the consequences of 
296 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
297 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As of 
2009, there were only eleven female firefighters. Allan & Bazelon, supra note 19. 
298 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2694 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting App. in No. 06-4996-cv at 
A1033) (Test consultant Christopher Hornick's testimony before the New Haven Civil Service 
Board); Joint App., supra note 53, at 96-97. As one retired firefighter put it, "Some of the worst 
officers you've ever had were 'book smart' officers." Thomas MacMillan, NAACP Backs City in 
Firefighter Case, NEW HAVEN INDEP., Jan. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/naacp _backs_city _in_firefighter 
case/. 
299 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 23, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
300 For testing in schools, see generally Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great 
American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education (2010), criti-
cizing the reliance on testing in the U.S. education system, or Peter Sacks, Standardized Minds: 
The High Price of America's Testing Culture and What We Can Do to Change It (1999), advo-
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placing so much stock in these devices as reliable predictors of success, 
either in education or on the job. 
As a high test scorer, Frank Ricci claimed he was entitled to promo-
tion.301 After all, he had overcome his dyslexia by studying eight to thir-
teen hours a day, spent more than $1,000 to purchase reading materials, 
and then paid his neighbor to read them on tape so he could "give it [his] 
best shot.,,302 We may forgive Ricci for assuming that his test performance 
guaranteed him the promotion, given the misconceived definition of "me-
rit" and "qualification" shared by many of our fellow citizens. It is harder, 
however, to overlook Ricci's insulting explanation for the poorer perfor-
mance of his black colleagues-that they just did not study as hard303 -as 
it "merely serves to buttress many white firefighters' false sense of supe-
riority, reinforcing classic examples of debasing stereotypes that African-
Americans are just 'dumb' and/or 'lazy. ",304 
The Ricci plaintiffs exacerbated this slur with their proposed alterna-
tives to non-certification of the eligible list-that the City could get tutors 
for the black firefighters or make additional study materials available to 
them.305 Experience teaches that it was neither ability, nor intelligence, nor 
study habits, but "the implicit problems that arise in high-stakes testing 
and candidates' own innate awareness of the stereotypes at play," that 
works against the minority test-takers. 306 
Yet Frank Ricci's views again reflect those of many white Americans 
who, according to several studies, attribute the gap in socioeconomic sta-
tus between whites and blacks to differences in their innate abilities and 
motivation.307 Any effort to assist minorities is thus viewed as "lowering 
standards" to accommodate the "less qualified.,,308 Response to the Ricci 
eating for the use of academic portfolios over testing to measure students' ability, or Defending 
Standardized Testing (Richard Phelps, ed. 2005), for a discussion of current standardized testing 
procedures. 
101 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006). 
102 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2667 (alteration in original). 
303 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 150-151. 
304 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21, 33-34, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 
07-1428). 
J05 Jd. at 34. 
J06 Jd. 
107 See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 596, 625 (2000). 
lOX See generally Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirma-
tive Action Debate, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1251-52 (1995). 
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decision largely confirms these beliefs in the myth of meritocracy. For ex-
ample, comments on the Employment Discrimination Law Professor list-
serv include: 
[Before the Supreme Court's decision] New Haven was rejecting or 
passing over highly qualified, degreed and experienced white officers in 
favor of uneducated, inexperienced and blatantly unqualified blacks, in 
some cases passing over medal and award winners in favor of low-
scoring blacks with arrest records. It was a sewer of race politics and 
R · . d' 309 ICCI put an en to It. 
It is sheer nonsense to suggest that if a failing or barely passing black 
candidate (with no diplomas and no credentials) loses a promotion to a 
white guy who expectedly scores #1 on the Captain's exam (because he 
has multiple degrees, certificates, is a paramedic, fire instructor, and a 
serious student of fire science and first response tactical protocols) that 
"race" discrimination has occurred. In academe, you folks may think it is 
okay to hire a marginal candidate for a faculty position over a more high-
ly credentialed and smarter person for the sake of "diversity"-you can't 
kill anyone by your negligence-but it is outrageous and the height of 
elitist arrogance to impose that PC on firefighters whose safety and lives 
liberals continue to play with. 3lO 
Another entry, posted on the New Haven Independent website, com-
plained that if the black plaintiffs "had put as much energy into studying 
and trying to pass the tests as they have put into whining and suing for 
special treatment, maybe they would be being promoted now.,,3!! 
How did our almost mystical belief in the sorting capacity of standar-
dized testing come about? 
Historically, employment testing emerged as a reform of the "spoils 
system," which was driven by patronage and corruption.312 In the 1850s, 
the federal government began to hold "pass examinations" to determine, in 
309 Ricci Discussion on the Empdiscr Listserv, Workplace Professor Blog (Oct. 7, 2009), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.comllaborproC blog/2009/1 Olricci -discussion-on-the-empdiscr-
listserv.html (comments by Cas on Oct. 7, 2009 3:02:05 PM, Oct. 8,2009 at 9:27:05 AM). 
310 ld 
311 Thomas MacMillan, supra note 189 (comment by Walt on Dec. 8,2009 11:23 AM. 
Posted December 8, 2009). 
312 The use of written exams for personnel selection in government bureaucracies dates 
back to China in the third century, during the Han Dynasty, and expanded during the Sui and 
Sung Dynasties. See DERKE BODDE, CHINESE IDEAS IN THE WEST (1948). It represented an ef-
fort to decrease reliance upon wealthy aristocratic candidates and to open positions to the lower 
classes.ld 
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an impartial manner, the qualifications of clerks.313 President Ulysses 
Grant, who campaigned on a platform of civil service reform, signed the 
first such bill in 1871, which provided for entry level and promotional 
competitive examinations.314 Following the assassination of President 
James Garfield by a disappointed office seeker in 1881, the civil service 
reform movement gained strength.315 The Civil Service Act of 1883 placed 
approximately 10% of federal positions under the regime of competitive 
exams.316 By the end of President Theodore Roosevelt's term, nearly two-
thirds of federal positions were subject to civil service procedures.317 The 
states soon followed suit. 318 
The widespread assumption that the examination system is merit-
based-indeed, the very equation of test success with merit-is reflected 
injudicial statements like the following: 
[T]he deeply rooted policies that support civil service examinations ... 
secure more efficient employees, promote better government, eliminate 
as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism, 
protect the employees and the public from the spoils system and secure 
the appointment to public positions of those whose merit and fitness 
have been determined by proper examination. 319 
3ll U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt, Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Ser-
vice, 190, available at http://www.opm.gov/BiographyofAnldeal/docs/TextOnlyVersion. pdf. 
314 1d. at 195. 
315 Id. at 198-20 I. 
316 1d. at 199,210. 
317 1d. at 216. 
318 Standardized tests were also employed by the Army during World War I to match re-
cruits with appropriate jobs. See Anna S. Rominger & Pamela Sandoval, Employee Testing: Re-
conciling the Twin Goals of Productivity and Fairness, 10 DEPAUL Bus. L.1. 299, 305 (1998). 
Meanwhile, psychologists developed multiple-choice exams that purportedly measured intelli-
gence. Id. By the 1950s, private employers were relying on such tests as an inexpensive method 
of personnel selection, even though it was recognized that the tests excluded women and minori-
ties in disproportionate numbers. Id. 
319 New Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 630 A.2d 131, 135 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1993). The remarks of U.S. District Judge Harrington in dismissing a challenge to the ac-
knowledged disparate impact of the Massachusetts test for licensing teachers further illustrates 
the point: 
Minimal standards are as necessary to the teaching profession as they are to the legal 
and medical professions. For how else can the public be assured that a teacher is com-
petent? A person who fails the bar examination does not practice law! A competent 
teacher is one who has thorough knowledge of his subject and the faculty of communi-
cating that knowledge effectively to his students. No student deserves to suffer an infe-
rior education because he was exposed to a teacher less than qualified. Society would 
be better served for plaintiffs to ameliorate their scholastic deficiencies by further dis-
ciplined study, rather than to seek to undermine the standards of a profession most es-
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Not surprisingly, the Ricci plaintiffs began their Supreme Court brief 
with the blanket assertion that "Connecticut law and New Haven's charter 
implement a civil service system that promises fair and merit-based treat-
ment for all. ,,320 
But what began as a progressive reform has evolved into a calcified 
structure that has little to do with actual qualifications for, or ability to per-
form, the job.32! The civil service system is easily gamed, and at its best 
rewards rote memorization over all other skills. It has also become the ma-
jor obstacle to equal employment opportunity in the public sphere. Replac-
ing "nepotism, cronyism, political horse-trading, graft and bribery" with a 
"strictly merit-based system,,322 is a laudable goal, but one hardly achieved 
by awarding jobs to the winners of the multiple-choice sweepstakes. As 
District Judge Nicholas Garaufis recently stated in his ruling against the 
New York City Fire Department examinations: 
[It] is natural to assume that the best performers on an employment test 
must be the best people for the job. [But] when an employment test is not 
adequately related to the job for which it tests-and when the test ad-
versely affects minority groups-we may not fall back on the notion that 
better test takers make better employees.323 
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg notes that nothing in the New Haven 
City Charter requires selection of firefighters by multiple-choice exams.324 
Rather, it mandates competitive examinations that are "practical in nature, 
shall relate to matters which fairly measure the relative fitness and capaci-
ty of the applicants to discharge the duties of the position which they seek, 
and shall take into account character, training, experience, physical and 
mental fitness.,,325 The City could thus choose among a variety of evalua-
tion methods. Instead, it has preserved the regime set out in its two-
sential to the vitality of a nation's culture. 
Alston v. Massachusetts, 661 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D. Mass. 2009). 
320 Brieffor Petitioner on the Merits at 2, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 
07-1428). 
321 Some public employers are therefore abandoning the system. See, e.g., Caitlin Castello, 
Wellesley Town Meeting Votes to Drop Civil Service for Police, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 11, 2010, at 
7. 
322 Complaint at ~ 15, Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006) (No. 
3:04cvII09). 
323 United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77,84 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
324 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691 (2009). 
325 Id. 
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decades-old collective bargaining agreement with the firefighters union,326 
particularly the 60% written to 40% oral split. 
No exploration of alternatives has apparently ever been undertaken. 
This is most likely because of pressure from the firefighter's union, which 
supported challenges to the City's decision not to certify the exam results, 
and even initially filed its own suit. 327 The case was ultimately dismissed 
because the court ruled the collective bargaining agent could not take sides 
in the dispute. 328 The firefighters union later supported its white members 
through other means.329 
Like many public employers, the NHFD has historically promoted in 
lock-step order of test scores.330 Where it has deviated from civil service 
rules, it has been to promote white officers to vacancies that did not even 
exist-a practice known as "underfilling"-which gives these candidates 
an advantage when the positions actually open.331 This practice was ulti-
mately struck down by the courtS.332 Even as the Ricci case was pending, 
the firefighters union and NHFD were again being sued for circumventing 
civil service requirements to promote a favored candidate.333 
When the City tried to alleviate some rigid aspects of civil service 
appointment, for example rounding test scores off to the nearest integer 
rather than carrying them out to the hundredths place, white officers suc-
cessfully challenged it. 334 Promotions in the police department, as a result, 
had to be made in strict order of test scores from the eligibility list: Sgt. 
326 Jd. at 2691, 2669. Unfortunately in such contexts, there is a history of union heads ad-
vantaging themselves and their buddies, often to the detriment of minorities and women. See 
generally PHILIP S. FONER, BLACK WORKERS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL 
TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds., 1978) (including statistical data on free 
black labor). 
327 New Haven Firefighters Local 825 v. City of New Haven, 2005 WL 3531465, at * I 
(D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2005). See Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire 
Fighters et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 
2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
m New Haven Firefighters Local 825, 2005 WL 3531465, at *\. 
329 See Allan & Bazelon, supra note 19. The union's support of the Ricci plaintiffs not 
surprisingly had a polarizing effect on the morale of black firefighters like Gary Tinney, who 
reported: "I can walk into firehouses and these [white] guys will walk away from me." MacMil-
lan, supra note 298. 
]]0 See Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 1113, 1120 n.9 (Conn. 2004). 
331 Jd. at 1119 n.2. 
3321d. at 1138. 
333 See Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 932 A.2d 1063 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
334 See Kelly v. City of New Haven, 2004 WL 114377 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004). 
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James W. Kelly (83.30); Sgt. John P. Kelly (83.00); Sgt. Joseph Streeto 
(78.39); Sgt. Kevin Emery (78.10); Sgt. Diane Langston (78.02).335 No re-
sponsible testing expert could validate such overly fine-tuned selections, 
which ignore both the margins of error as well as the limits of the test's 
validity. 
A. TEST VALIDITY AND JOB RELATION 
Multiple-choice (sometimes dubbed "multiple-guess") exams are 
popular in large part because "they are easy and inexpensive to administer, 
and seemingly 'objective. ",336 Scored mechanically, they appear to take 
corruption, bias, and favoritism out of the process. Yet they are of dubious 
validity in predicting job performance, place a premium on test-taking 
skills, strategies, and gambits,337 and are widely recognized as disadvan-
taging minorities.338 
Two members of the Ricci majority themselves, Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Antonin Scalia, have criticized the continued reliance by law 
schools on the multiple-choice LSA T: "[N]o modem law school can claim 
ignorance of the poor performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the 
Law School Admissions test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue 
to use the test and then attempt to 'correct' for black underperformance by 
using racial discrimination in admissions.,,339 Yet they were seemingly un-
concerned with the discriminatory use of such tests in the civil service 
context. 
Griggs teaches that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to 
exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
335 I d. at 4. 
336 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-
1428). 
337 Vulcan Pioneers v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Servs., 625 F. Supp. 527, 539 (D.N.J. 
1985). The dramatic expansion of the test-preparation industry--Kaplan, Princeton Review, 
etc.-only underscores this point. 
338 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-
1428). See also Winfred Arthur Jr., Bryan D. Edwards, & Gerald V. Barrett, Multiple-Choice 
and Constructed Response Tests of Ability: Race-Based Subgroup Performance Differences On 
Alternative Paper-and-Pencil Test Formats, 55 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 985,991-92 (2002). 
339 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369-70 (2003) (Scalia, J. & Thomas, 1., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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practice is prohibited.,,340 "Congress has placed on the employer the bur-
den of showing that any [such] given requirement must have a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.,,341 Tests must be shown to be 
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work 
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which can-
didates are being evaluated," and to "fairly [measure] the knowledge or 
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant 
seeks.,,342 In short, exams must reliably predict an individual's success on 
the job. As the Griggs court noted, "[what] Congress has forbidden is giv-
ing these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are de-
monstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.,,343 
As U.S. District Judge Garaufis observed, the Griggs doctrine oper-
ates as both a limitation and a license: employers are given explicit per-
mission to use job-related tests even if they have adverse impact, but only 
if they can be validated through professionally accepted methods. 344 When 
Congress codified Griggs in 1991, it emphasized that a practice that pro-
duces disparate impact must be both "job related for the position in ques-
tion and consistent with business necessity. ,,345 
"History," Chief Justice Warren Burger noted, "is filled with exam-
ples of men and women who rendered highly effective performance with-
out the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of certificates, 
diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress 
mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to become mas-
ters of reality.,,346 Now, with Ricci, such tests have indeed become "mas-
340 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 I U.S. 424, 43 I (197 I). 
341 Id at 432. 
342 Id at 434 (alteration in original). Since Griggs, the Court requires even more rigorous 
statistical demonstration of job relation by professionally accepted psychometric standards. See 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (I 982). 
343 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (alteration in original). Since "neither the high school comple-
tion requirement nor the general intelligence test [was] shown to bear a demonstrable relation-
ship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used," Duke Power Company could 
no longer use them as selection devices. Id at 431. 
344 United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
345 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1 )(A)(i) (2006). 
346 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433. A recent example is the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Medi-
cine for 2009, Carol W. Greider. See Regine Nuzzo, Biography of Carol W. Greider, 102 
PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 8077 (2005) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMCI149435I?tool=pmcentrez. Because she suffers from dyslexia, which 
affected her scores on standardized tests, only two graduate schools even offered her an inter-
view.ld. Similarly, by her own admission, Sonia Sotomayor did poorly on her SAT, but none-
theless graduated Princeton with highest academic honors and now sits on the Supreme Court. 
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ters of reality," as evidenced by Justice Kennedy's naIve reliance on one 
firefighter's plea for certification of the results at the CSB: '''[E]very one' 
of the questions on the written examination 'came from the [study] ma-
terial . . . [I]f you read the materials and you studied the material, you 
would have done well on the test. ",347 
But what both Kennedy and this firefighter failed to recognize is that, 
while "[a] test fashioned from materials pertaining to the job ... superfi-
cially may seem job-related, [w ]hat is at issue is whether it demonstrably 
selects people who will perform better the required on-the-job beha-
viors.,,348 As the First Circuit Court of Appeals observed many years ago: 
"[T]here is a difference between memorizing (or absorbing through past 
experience) the firefighter terminology and being a good firefighter. If the 
Boston Red Sox recruited players on the basis of their knowledge of base-
ball history and vocabulary, the team might acquire authorities ... who 
could not bat, pitch, or catch.,,349 Indeed, there is a wide gulf between abil-
See Walter Kim, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Aptitude: Do Our Merit-based Ideas Get Us 
What We Deserve?, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., July 5, 2009, at II. Our "conventional, test-
based notions of merit might well have stopped her, had they been strictly enforced, before she 
even got started." Id. Author Walter Kim himself won the multiple-choice competition and 
ended up at Princeton, only to find that his perfect SAT scores did little to ensure real academic 
success. See WALTER KIRN, LOST IN THE MERITOCRACY: THE UNDEREDUCATION OF AN 
OVERACHIEVER (2009). 
347 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009). Similar circularity of logic drove the 
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Test 21, which evaluated verbal 
ability, was held validated as a useful indicator of police academy success (rather than actual 
performance on the job) by a validation study showing a positive correlation between the test 
scores entering the training academy and test scores during the training program. Id. at 258, 262, 
270 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). As Justice Brennan noted, this is an unsurprising correlation, since 
both sets of tests put a premium on reading ability: 
Where employers try to validate written qualification tests by proving a correlation 
with written examinations in a training course, there is a substantial danger that people 
who have good verbal skills will achieve high scores on both tests due to verbal ability, 
rather than "job-specific ability." As a result, employers could validate any entrance 
examination that measures only verbal ability by giving another written test that meas-
ures verbal ability at the end of a training course. Any contention that the resulting cor-
relation between examination scores would be evidence that the initial test is "job re-
lated" is plainly erroneous. 
Id. at 261-63,270. 
348 NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). 
349 Id. at 1023. Multiple-choice tests are "more probative of the test-taker's ability to recall 
what a particular text stated on a given topic than of his firefighting or supervisory knowledge or 
abilities." Vulcan Pioneers v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Servs., 625 F. Supp. 527, 539-40 
(D.N.J. 1985). Reviewing a similar exam, the Eleventh Circuit observed: "The best that can be 
said of the City'S test based on the evidence at trial was that it may have been valid with respect 
to reading materials provided to the applicants. This is immaterial, however, to whether the con-
tent of the questions related to the performance of the job [of fire lieutenant]." Nash v. City of 
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ity to perform a job and ability to think about it. 350 
Civil service multiple-choice exams for promotional posItIons are 
aptly characterized as "quasi-academic hurdle[s]" having little relation to 
job success.351 In the Ricci case, the limitations of such tests were exacer-
bated by the way the exam was administered-after a three-month cram-
ming period during which candidates were directed to the specific portions 
of the fire manuals that would be tested.352 
Regarding professional education in the fields of law, medicine, and 
engineering, an influential Carnegie study acknowledged that students 
must learn abundant amounts of information, "but the 'bottom line' of 
their efforts will not be what they know but what they can do.,,353 Know-
ing what to do and being able to actually do it are two very different 
things, and "stressful jobs, like those of police officers and firefighters, are 
especially prone to this problem.,,354 
Drivers obtain their licenses by first passing a multiple-choice test, 
which requires them to identify traffic signs and calculate the braking dis-
tance at certain speeds. This is followed, however, by an actual road test. 
Similarly, scuba divers are certified by an initial written test, requiring 
them to identify equipment, buoyancy, and water pressure at different 
depths, but after which they must pass a physical test consisting of pool 
and open water dives. Law schools select faculty not solely on the basis of 
academic achievement, but only after evaluating the candidate's job talk, 
to observe his or her skills and potential as a teacher. 355 
Nonetheless, despite ample evidence that there is at best a poor corre-
lation between multiple-choice tests and fire officer job performance, the 
Ricci Court majority stubbornly insisted that Frank Ricci had "earned" his 
Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1988), op. reinstated, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
350 Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp. at 541. 
351 Nash, 837 F.2d at 1539 n.7. 
352 See Ricci, 120 S. Ct. at 2666. 
353 William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wagner, Lloyd Bond, & Lee. S. 
Schulman, Educating Lawyers 23 (2007) (emphasis added). 
354 Richard S. Barrett, Challenging the Myths of Fair Employment Practices 40 (1998). 
355 In contrast, lawyers are licensed based on written bar examinations requiring memori-
zation of the law of that jurisdiction. As such, they have been severely criticized. See Sympo-
sium, Rethinking the Licensing of New Attorneys: An Exploration of Alternatives to the Bar Ex-
am, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. vii. (2004) (examining alternatives to bar examinations and 
concluding that current examinations fail to assure competency of attorneys to practice indepen-
dently). See also Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728,740 n.13 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (re-
porting the reliability coefficient of the 1991 multi-state bar was a modest 0.79). 
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promotion to fire lieutenant, along with the awesome responsibilities that 
come with that position, by virtue of his multiple-choice prowess. 
Test experts universally recognize that the knowledge, abilities, and 
skills (KASOs) required of a fire lieutenant or captain cannot be meaning-
fully measured by a multiple-choice examination,356 and courts have so 
held. 357 As one decision noted, a fire captain's job is a sophisticated posi-
tion that "involves complex behaviors, good interpersonal skills, the abili-
ty to make decisions under tremendous pressure, and a host of other abili-
ties none of which is easily measured by a written, multiple-choice 
test. ,,358 
Cognitive and reading skills, the primary matters addressed by such 
tests, are a small part of what makes an effective fire supervisor.359 And by 
the time a firefighter is eligible for promotion, job knowledge of the sort 
tested by the New Haven exams is presumed because the firefighter has 
completed the training academy and been on the job for several years. 360 A 
firefighter's ability to memorize and regurgitate a manual is a non-sequitur 
at the point of promotion. 
356 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 16, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). "Written tests do not 
correspond well to the skills and abilities actually required for the job of a fire officer and are 
thus poor predictors of which candidates will make successful fire lieutenants and captains." Id. 
Even when used to select entry-level firefighters, written tests obviously cannot address the my-
riad of skills cadets need to succeed, such as ability to operate fire engines, to perform rescues 
from multiple-story buildings, and to work as a team. 
357 See Nash v. City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534,1535 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Just because 
test questions are drafted by qualified city employees does not mean that the questions are job-
related."); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 359 (8th Cir. 
1980) (finding invalid the St. Louis Fire Department's multiple-choice test used for fire captain 
eligibility because of its inability to differentiate job performance), but see Firefighters Inst. for 
Racial Equal. ex rei. Anderson v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing city's multiple-choice test for battalion chief); Vulcan Pioneers v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil 
Services, 625 F. Supp. 527, 539-542 (D.N.J. 1985) (finding invalid the multiple-choice tests 
used by fire departments throughout New Jersey because the tests failed to evaluate the abilities 
required of a fire captain). See also Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 693618, at *13 (N.D. Ill. 
2005), rev'd on other grnds, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding city's evidence insufficient to 
support its reliance on test performance as an indicator of cadets' trainability because test was 
designed around on-the-job skills rather than actual training skills). 
358 Firefighters Inst. jor Racial Equal., 616 F.2d at 359. There are validated written in-
struments available that do evaluate critical non-cognitive abilities, but they are rarely used. See 
United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
359 Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp. at 547. 
360 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-
1428). 
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Rank-ordering candidates on the basis of these multiple-choice tests 
is particularly inappropriate. It "satisfies a felt need for objectivity, but it 
does not necessarily select better job performers.,,361 Reflecting the con-
sensus of test professionals, Justice Ginsburg recognized that a "difference 
of one or two points on a multiple-choice exam should not be decisive of 
an applicant's promotion chances if that difference bears little relationship 
to the applicant's qualifications for the job.,,362 Even if an exam has validi-
ty as a crude pass/fail screening device, it may not be a reliable method of 
ranking candidates, which requires a showing that a better score is likely 
to translate into better job performance.363 Fire departments have not been 
able to demonstrate this.364 Typically, most test-takers answer a substantial 
percentage of the questions correctly, and the only differentiation comes 
as a result of a few questions that do not correlate with job performance.365 
A recent administration of the entry-level firefighter exam in Massa-
chusetts was found to have a margin of error of 8 points, so that there was 
no meaningful difference between a score of 100 and a score of 92.366 And 
the city of Chicago devoted considerable resources to develop an entry-
level firefighter exam, only to have the experienced industrial psychologist 
it retained for the project admit in testimony that there was no statistical 
difference between scores within 13 points of each other-that is, a 98 
361 Guardians Assoc. of the N.Y.C. Police Dep't., Inc. v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 630 F.2d 
79, 100 (2d Cir. 1980), quoted in United States V. Vulcan Soc'y, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 128 
(E.D.N.Y.2009). 
362 Ricci V. DeStefano, 129 S.C!. 2658, 2705 (2009) (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
363 See Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp., at 538~~39 (explaining that while content validity of 
an exam is appropriate for determining the minimum level of competency needed for a job, it is 
inappropriate for ranking purposes; finding invalid the multiple-choice exam that tested only 
knowledge and not abilities); Hearn, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 737 n.9 ("Content validity is an appro-
priate tool for validation of a test used solely as a measure of minimal competence to perform 
the job .... But for ranking purposes, unrelated to minimum competence, there must be proof 
that a higher test score correlates to better job performance."). See also EEOC Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 C.F.R. §§ 5(G), 14(C)(9), 15(C)(7) (1978) (ranking 
is appropriate only where the user can show "that a higher score on a content valid selection 
procedure is likely to result in better job performance.") This is especially the case where rank-
ing "has a greater adverse impact than use on an appropriate pass/fail basis." Id. at § 5(G). See 
also United States v. Vulcan Society, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 128-·30 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
364 See, e.g., Firelighters Inst., 616 F.2d at 359, rev'd on other grnds, 528 F.3d 488 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 693618 (N.D. Ill. 2005), rev'd on other grnds, 
528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008). 
365 Firefighters Inst., 616 F.2d at 360. 
31i6 Bradley V. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 173 (D. Mass. 2006); see also Bos. Po-
lice Supervisors Fed'n V. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13,24 (1st Cir. 1998) (scores within a three-
point spread were functionally equivalent on promotional exam). 
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could not be meaningfully distinguished from an 85.367 Chicago ignored 
the consultant's admonition.368 
Test validation was aptly defined by New Haven's then-Corporation 
Counsel Thomas Ude in his remarks to the CSB: "The question of whether 
an examination is valid is: is it really testing for what you're looking to 
test for?,,369 Validation ensures that there is a reliable scientific basis for 
inferring that a higher test score corresponds to superior job skills and per-
formance. 370 Ude further explained: 
[T]he goal of the test is to decide who is going to be a good supervisor 
ultimately, not who is going to be a good test-taker. 
... [N]o one faced with a scene that our Lieutenants and Captains will be 
called upon to supervise, assess and manage is going to be presented 
with a multiple-choice option. 
When you're talking about something like accounting where the prin-
ciples are clear and there's pretty much only one way to do it, a multiple-
choice exam or some other type of exam like that may be much simpler. 
B h·· , . 371 ut t is lsn t accountmg. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures ("EEOC Uniform Guide-
lines"),372 traditionally granted great deference by the courts,m recognize 
367 Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2005), rev'd on other grnds, 528 F.3d 488 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
36S See id. 
369 Joint App., supra note 53, at 138. Ude pointed to Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. N.J. Dep 'f. 
of Civil Serv., 625 F. Supp. 527 (D.N.J. 1985), in which the court rejected the state's promotion-
al exams for fire lieutenant and captain because they tested for the specific terminology used in a 
particular manual, rather than the underlying concepts. For example. one question asked, "Ac-
cording to Firefighting Principles and Practices, the quality that firefighters most want in an of-
ficer is [blank?]" 625 F. Supp., at 539. The judge found the test "more probative of the test-
taker's ability to recal1 what was in a particular text than of his firefighting or supervisory know-
ledge or abilities." ld. 
370 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 7, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
371 Joint App., supra note 53, at 139-40. 
m 28 C.F.R. §50.l4 et. seq (2011). 
m See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 ("The [EEOC], having en-
forcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting 703(h) to permit only the use of job-
related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to 
great deference."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 412-13 (1975); Firefighters 
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three modes of validating selection devices. 374 It is worth noting that these 
guidelines are barely mentioned in Justice Kennedy's Ricci opinion.375 
The two more rigorous types, criterion-related and construct validity, 
require empirical demonstration that the device is predictive of or signifi-
cantly correlated with job performance.376 The third, content validity, is 
the only one even arguably applicable in defense of the NHFD exams. 377 
Content validity is generally easier to establish,378 as it merely requires 
showing that the substance of the selection device is "representative of 
important aspects of performance on the job" for which it is used. 379 Simp-
Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 358 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980) (recognizing 
that EEOC's interpretations of its Unifonn Guidelines are "entitled to great deference by the 
court" because the guidelines are "highly technical and somewhat difficult for those untrained in 
test construction to comprehend"). 
374 See Vulcan Pioneers v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Servs., 625 F. Supp. 527, 545-46 
(D. N.J.1985). 
375 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2679 (2009). Justice Kennedy refers to the guide-
lines only to criticize New Haven for not demanding a validity study. Id. One commentary 
plausibly speculates: 
[T]he Court may have conflated the issue of professional test development with the 
more important question of test validation. In other words, although the tests used by 
New Haven had been professionally developed that does not necessarily mean they had 
been validated under the law. Rather, validation requires more extensive analysis of 
how the test might predict perfonnance .... 
Diane Avery, Maria L. Ontiveros, Roberto L. Corrada, Michael Selmi & Melissa 
Hart, Employment Discrimination Law: Cases and Materials on Equality in the 
Workplace 288 (8th ed. 2010). 
376 Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp. at 545-46. A criterion-related study determines whether 
the test is a valid predictor of job perfonnance by following test-takers who had been promoted 
and assessing their actual performance in the job for a period of time. Id. 
377 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 7 n.2, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
37X See Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 630 F.2d 
79,93 (2d Cir. 1980). 
379 28 C.F.R. § 50.14, § 5(B) (2011). See also 28 C.F.R. § 14(C)(4) ("To demonstrate the 
content validity of a selection procedure, a user should show that the behavior(s) demonstrated 
in the selection procedure are a representative sample of the behavior(s) of the job in question ... 
. In addition, to be content valid, a selection procedure measuring a skill or ability should either 
closely approximate an observable work behavior or its product should closely approximate an 
observable work product. If a test purports to sample a work behavior or to provide a sample of 
a work product, the manner and setting of the selection procedure and its level and complexity 
should closely approximate the work situation .... As the content of the selection procedure less 
resembles a work behavior, or the setting and manner of the administration of the selection pro-
cedure less resemble the work situation, or the result less resembles a work product, the less 
likely the selection procedure is to be content valid. "). The test user should be prepared to "iden-
tify the work behavior(s) which each item or part of the selection procedure is intended to sam-
ple or measure." 28 C.F.R. § 15(C)(5). 
"The mere fact that a test 'is representative of important aspects of performance on the 
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ly put, the content of the exam must match the content of the job.380 
Common examples include requiring an applicant for a secretarial position 
to type several pages or a bookkeeper to tally revenues and expenses. 
But as common sense tells us, and as numerous courts have con-
cluded,381 multiple-choice exams like those in Ricci do not remotely repli-
cate the job of fire supervisor. This is why the Uniform Guidelines reflect 
a general skepticism regarding such paper and pencil tests/82 and instead 
require empirical evidence that the knowledge tested is linked with better 
performance on the job?83 Because these tests are usually poor approxima-
tions of actual work behaviors, they rarely make the grade for content va-
lidity.384 U.S. District Judge H. Lee Sarokin succinctly summed up the ex-
perience with multiple-choice devices: "they elevate memory over ability, 
knowledge of abstract concepts over practical know-how, terminology 
over the ideas they represented, and test-taking ability overall.,,385 
job' (as content validity requires) matters only because it is reasonable to suppose that such a 
test will usefully distinguish among candidates-in other words, that using the test in selection 
will lead to a better performing workforce." Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 693618, at *12 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22,2005) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grnds, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), 
rev'd 130 S. Ct. 2191. However, that is rarely the case. In Lewis, for example, the City candidly 
conceded that there were no measurable differences in job performance between black and white 
firefighters despite markedly different scores on cognitive ability tests. Id. Nor could the City 
support its assertion that there was a relationship between test performance and the "trainability" 
of cadets. Id. 
380 Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir. 
1977); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City ofSt. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 361 (8th Cir. 1980). 
381 See, e.g., Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1538 (lIth Cir. 
1988); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal., 616 F.2d at 357; Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp. at 
539-42. 
382 See Uniform Guidelines § 14(b )(3) ("Criterion measures consisting of paper and pencil 
tests will be closely reviewed for job relevance. ") 
383 Firefighters, 616 F.2d at 357. 
384 Uniform Guidelines § 15(C)(4). Compare M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 
2009 WL 604898 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009) (elaborate job analysis, test preparation, and valida-
tion process produced a content-valid exam) with Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 693618, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2005) (entry-level firefighter test had a pronounced disparate impact on 
black applicants and was not a reliable measure of the four cognitive abilities it was designed to 
measure). Multiple-choice exams also typically raise issues regarding the readability of the ques-
tions, and invite criticism that the appropriate reading-level required for the test is beyond that 
required for the job. See, e.g., Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728,741 (S.D. Miss. 
2003) (considering testimony of expert witness that reading level of test exceeded level required 
for sergeant's job by several grade levels, making the test more about reading ability than about 
actual required knowledge). 
385 Vulcan Pioneers, 625 F. Supp. at 546. See also Arthur, Edwards, & Barret, supra note 
338 (discussing firefighter promotional tests). Physical ability tests have been found to correlate 
substantially better with entry-level firefighter performance than cognitive exams. Bradley v. 
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Given the well-established EEOC standards, the record before the 
Court in Ricci was woefully inadequate to weigh the validity of the NHFD 
examinations, or to assess less discriminatory altematives.386 While the 
majority justices were clearly impressed that Frank Ricci believed the test 
questions were based on the Department's own rules, procedures, "nation-
ally recognized" materials, and "accepted standards" for firefighting, and 
that another firefighter insisted that "every one of the questions came from 
the study material,,,387 all that says nothing about the test's capacities to 
predict supervisory performance. 
Moreover, several firefighters who appeared before the CSB disa-
greed with these assertions,388 and some pointed out conflicts between the 
materials the test takers were told to study and actual NHFD practice.389 
The consultant who prepared the exams admitted that the questions were 
taken from national textbooks, and that some had no relevance to the 
NHFD.390 The CSB was also advised that there was "quite a heavy empha-
City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 175 (D. Mass. 2006). 
3X6 DIANE AVERY, supra note 375, at 288. This makes it particularly jarring to see Peti-
tioners' Brief on the Merits begin with the blithe declaration that the exams in question were 
"content-valid." Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 1, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 
(2009) (No. 07-1428). 
3X7 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (quoting App. in No. 06-4996-cv at A 785-
86). 
388 Even firefighters who supported the Ricci plaintiffs conceded that the tests were not 
well-suited to the NHFD. Melissa Bailey, Latino Group Backs White Firefighters, NEW HAVEN 
INDEP., Feb. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.newhavenindependent.orglarchives/2009/02/firefighter _ sto.php. One called the test 
"unfair," and testified at the CSB that some of the questions were not relevant to the knowledge 
or skills necessary for the supervisory positions, such as whether to park a fire truck facing "up-
town" or "downtown," a question copied from a New York City training manual. Ricci v. DeS-
tefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. Conn. 2006). Others complained that there were questions 
that did not pertain to the NHFD, such as reference to a "Second Battalion," which the depart-
ment does not have. Joint App., supra note 53, at 48. Some questions even referred to equipment 
no longer in use. Id. 
Other complaints from firefighters concerned the cost of the study materials, which was 
over $500, and the volume, which exceeded 1,200 pages. Kristen Jensen & Jane Mills, Soto-
mayor Ruling Exposes a Racial Split in Firehouses (Update 2), BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 25, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adYWwnqH6kbs. There 
were accusations as well that some firefighters had the books way in advance of the official ex-
am notice. Joint App., supra note 53, at 112-13. 
389 Id. at 44. For example, the question "If you get into a motor vehicle accident en route 
to an emergency call, what do you do?" required the answer "Call a supervisor of apparatus." 
However, the NHFD actually tells firefighters something different·-to call the Chief or the po-
lice.ld. at 45. 
390 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 20-21, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) (citations omit-
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sis on issues that only drivers of an apparatus would be familiar with.,,391 
The number of questions dealing with such narrow issues clearly disad-
vantaged those without that experience.392 Because training in the NHFD 
was not "on a level playing field as it should be," those receiving the most 
training were at a distinct advantage. 393 Dr. Janet Helms, an expert on the 
influence of race and culture on test performance, observed that "there 
were more opportunities for training and performance in the actual roles 
that were tested if you were a white male than if you were members of the 
other groupS.,,394 
Due to these numerous flaws in the NHFD written exams, the Society 
for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, with extensive experience 
designing and validating promotional tests for fire and police departments, 
urged the Supreme Court that "there is no basis to conclude that certifica-
tion of the test results would have led to the promotion of the most quali-
fied candidates.,,395 Nor was there "any reasonable likelihood that the City 
could have demonstrated that the NHFD promotional examinations were 
valid. ,,396 
A firefighter from neighboring Bridgeport appearing at the CSB re-
ported that his city had downgraded the proportion of its civil service 
score based on the written test from 70% to 30% because "an individual's 
ability to answer a multiple-choice [exam] does nothing but measure their 
ability to read and retain.,,397 He added, "[t]he thing that separates whether 
you're going to be a good officer or not is your ability to score well on 
[the oral exam, which]. .. deals with scenarios, real-life scenarios. What 
ted). 
391 Joint App., supra note 53, at 119. 
392 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149 
393 Joint App., supra note 53, at 119. 
394 I d. at 125. The EEOC Uniform Guidelines caution against selecting candidates on the 
basis of knowledge, skills, or ability that can be readily obtained in an orientation period or on 
the job. Uniform Guidelines, § 5(F). See also Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728 
(S.D. Miss. 2003). Questions on the NHFD exams about the melting points of certain materials 
would seem to fall into that category. Joint App., supra note 53, at 138. A testing expert also 
concluded that certain questions had "some pretty complex descriptions, for example, for the 
tactical items, which would make it difficult for someone to really interpret and understand that 
without other information." Joint App., supra note 53, at 106. 
395 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
396 1d. at 6. 
]97 Joint App., supra note 53, at 65. Studies have validated firefighter entry-level exams 
when the written component is reduced to 40% of the composite score. Bradley v. City ofLynn, 
443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 152-53 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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would you do in a particular situation?,,398 
The oral component of the New Haven selection process was de-
signed to assess managerial and leadership skills by requiring candidates 
to give detailed responses to specific fire scene situations, to suggest train-
ing strategies, and to plan interactive scenarios addressing subordinates' 
concerns.399 It drew upon the candidates' years of on-the-job experience 
and in-service training.40o Nonetheless, the NHFD persisted in giving con-
clusive weight to the multiple-choice instrument.401 
Command presence is recognized as the hallmark of a successful fire 
officer. It requires the supervisor on the scene of a fire "to act decisively, 
to communicate orders clearly and thoroughly to personnel on the scene, 
and to maintain a sense of confidence and calm even in the midst of in-
tense anxiety, confusion, and panic.,,402 The developer of the NHFD writ-
ten tests admitted that they were not designed to evaluate these traits. 403 
Yet the consequences of promoting superior officers lacking command 
398 Joint App., supra note 53, at 66. See also Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psycholo-
gists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) 
(No. 07-1428); Howe v. City of Akron, 2008 WL 5101239 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2008) (regard-
ing the fairness of an oral assessment exercise, which consisted in part of a conference with a 
subordinate, and was used to determine who was promoted to the rank of fire lieutenant or cap-
tain). 
399 Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 9, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 
07-1428). See also Briscoe Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, at ~ 10 (providing 
examples of such questions). 
400 See Brieffor Petitioner on the Merits at 9, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) 
(No. 07-1428). 
401 A 60% oral and 40% written split would have ranked firefighter Briscoe ninth, instead 
of twenty-fourth. Briscoe Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, at ~ 15. A 70% oral to 
30% written ratio would have placed three other black candidates on the promotion list as well. 
Id. at ~ 17. 
Critics of oral exams argue they are open to subjectivity, bias, and manipulation, and note 
in the specific context of the New Haven procedures that each panel had two minority members, 
thus potentially slanting the results. See Comments, After Ricci Ruling. Black Firefighter Sues 
City (Oct. 15-20, 2009), available at 
http://newhavenindependent.org/archives/200911 O/after _ricci_ rul.php. But the Ricci plaintiffs 
conceded that the panelists were knowledgeable, well-trained and prepared, and that the process 
was closely monitored by lOS experts; and "post-assessment review showed the panel ratings 
were sound, consistent, and indicative of a high level of reliability." Brief for Petitioner on the 
Merits at 9, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
402 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 1 I, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) (citations omitted). 
403 Joint App., supra note 53, at 106. See also Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City 
of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 511 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that failure to test for the major 
attribute of a fire captain, supervisory ability, is the typical fatal flaw found in these exams). 
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presence can be dire. 
A two-year federal investigation into a fatal 2007 fire at a Boston res-
taurant concluded that the fire supervisors made a series of tragically 
flawed decisions that caused a massive fireball to propel through the 
building and kill two firefighters.404 The Firefighter Fatality Division of 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) con-
cluded that the first supervisor to arrive failed to adequately size up the 
situation or establish a command post, but instead proceeded immediately 
into the burning building.405 The Report observed: "To effectively coordi-
nate and direct fire fighting operations on the scene, it is essential that the 
Ie [(incident commander)] does not become involved in the fire fighting 
efforts.,,406 Meanwhile, the second supervisor ordered the windows broken 
before the fire had been properly ventilated, causing the fatal downdraft.407 
He had failed to communicate with the firefighter trying unsuccessfully to 
cut a release hole in the roof, and did not know the number or location of 
the firefighters in the building.408 
The NIOSH blamed inadequate training and oversight of the supervi-
sors for the breakdown of the entire incident management system-failure 
to assess the scene, to maintain a command post, to properly evaluate risk 
versus gain, to assign and delegate functions, to maintain accountability, 
and to effectively communicate with firefighters on the scene.409 In short, 
the Boston Fire Department failed to ensure that its superior officers pos-
sessed the skills and knowledge-the job performance requirements 
(JPRs)-to safely and effectively carry out their duties.410 
Virtually foreseeing such a tragic event, U.S. District Judge Sarokin 
recognized, in his ruling against a multiple-choice exam for selection of 
404 Donovan Slack, Federal Report Finds Supervision, Training Lacking, Bos. GLOBE, 
Nov. 12,2009, at G 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200732.htm\. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. 
407 Id. 
408 Jd. There were other blunders as well, such as a firefighter proceeding into the building 
with a water hose that was both too short and lacking in a sufficient water connection. Jd. 
409 Id. 
410 Interesting in this regard is a comparison made by a noted testing expert. He adminis-
tered an exam that included the question "When firefighters arrive on the scene of a house fire, 
what should the lieutenant do first?" White candidates were the highest scorers on the written 
question. But when he showed test-takers a photo of a home in flames and asked for an oral re-
sponse, minorities did considerably better. Krissah Thompson, Employment Exam Writers Tread 
Carefully, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-
dynlcontentlarticle/2009/09/06/ AR2009090601988 .htm\. 
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fire captain, that while the most important function of the firefighter is to 
fight fires, "the most important job of the fire captain is to evaluate condi-
tions at a fire scene and direct appropriate action be taken.,,411 A selection 
process that fails to emphasize that dimension of the job is "fundamentally 
in error.,,412 
To equate the qualifications for a fire supervisor with the results of a 
multiple-choice exam is the height of folly. Corporation Counsel Ude had 
this in mind when he asked the CSB not to certify the NHFD exam results: 
It is not, as a rule, fair to change the rules of a game after the game has 
been played. But we're not talking about a game here. We're talking 
about a promotional exam that will affect the lives and safety not only of 
the people promoted but the people who they will be supervising and 
commanding and the citizens and the public of this city.413 
Police and fire chiefs often complain about the arbitrary constraints 
placed upon them by civil service testing. Boston Police Commissioner 
Edward F. Davis points to the promotion exam as a constant "roadblock 
for minorities," impeding efforts to diversify the supervisory ranks: "One 
percentage point [on the exam] does not make or break a candidate, and 
we need to consider other things in promotions, such as leadership and the 
ability to communicate. All those things can't be tested.,,414 He added that 
"the disparate impact of the exam stems from the way it's administered-
it's a written exam, and at the end of the day, you don't have enough mi-
nority candidates to choose from. I can't tell you why that's happening, 
but I can tell you that it is.,,415 
411 Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Servs., 625 F. Supp. 527, 541 
(D.N.J. 1985). 
412 ld 
413 Joint App., supra note 53, at 140. 
414 ld. See also Maria Cramer, As Hub Promotes Officers, Discrimination Claims Await 
Hearing, BoS. GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2010, at 1,9 (reporting the promotion of twenty-five sergeants, 
only one of whom was a minority; six captains and fourteen lieutenants, all white males). 
The consequences of inhibiting the ability of public safety forces to diversify their super-
visory ranks are illustrated dramatically by the arrest of internationally-recognized Harvard 
scholar Henry Louis ("Skip") Gates in his own home in July, 2009. The white sergeant, called to 
the scene on a neighbor's report of Gates' efforts to pry loose his stuck door, accused Gates of 
trying to burlarize the house, engaged him in a verbal confrontation, and then arrested him for 
disordererly conduct. An African American police sergeant in Boston observed that if he had 
responded to the call, "I would have immediately recognized Skip. The fact that a white officer, 
who patrols Cambridge for a living, didn't recognize this national celebrity in front of him, tells 
you where we are in terms of cultural diversity." Brian R. Ballou, Minorities Hired But Not Ad-
vanced, Bos. GLOBE, July 27, 2009, at G I. 
415 Id Commissioner Davis complained that he was legally bound to mimic the results of 
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B. TESTBIAS 
Bias is a problem as old as written exams themselves. The first bu-
reaucracy to utilize them, in China, sought to mitigate favoritism by em-
ploying copyists to rewrite applicants' answers to ensure that the 
handwriting could not be identified by the graders, who might be inclined 
c . . 416 lor or agamst certam persons. 
The concern about equity persists centuries later. The consultant who 
prepared the NHFD exams admitted that job knowledge tests like the kind 
used by the City "have a long history of resulting in disparate impact.,,417 
Indeed "[i]t is well-established that minority candidates fare less well than 
their Caucasian counterparts on standardized written examinations, and 
especially multiple-choice tests.,,418 Although experts on standardized test-
ing are unable to fully explain this disparity,419 studies suggest that: (1) the 
the statewide multiple-choice exam even though it favors rote memorization over all other skills, 
but was exploring other alternatives like interviews to assess applicants' ability to handle crime 
investigations and other real world situations faced by officers. [d. 
Some chiefs have found their way around the constraints. A 1974 study of the Cambridge 
Police Department by the International Association of Chiefs of Police criticized the depart-
ment's "abdication" of applicant evaluation to civil service, and recommended that oral inter-
views be conducted as part of the promotion process. Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99,102 nA 
(I st Cir. 1980). The Chief did just that, and rated interviewees on the basis of attitude, loyalty, 
judgment, leadership, supervisory abilities, initiative, resourcefulness, and technical skills. [d. 
When challenged for deviating from strict civil service practice, the court upheld the Chief's 
decision to skip over two white officers at the top of the sergeants' eligible list in favor of black 
candidates. [d. The Massachusetts civil service statute requires the appointing authority to sub-
mit a written explanation justifying bypass of the candidate at the top of the list, and the admin-
istrator has the right to reject it. MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 31, § 27 (2010); Lopez v. Massachusetts, 
558 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Bradley v. City ofLynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145,150 (D. Mass. 2006). 
Frustration with civil service is shared by U.S. District Judge Patti Saris, who complained 
that "Massachusetts has had over thirty years to fine-tune a better approach" to firefighter selec-
tion than multiple-choice exams, which she found had a disparate impact on minorities and no 
relation to job performance. Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 175. 
416 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL & EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN 19 
(Cecil R. Reynolds & Randy W. Kampaus eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
417 E-mail from Chad Legel, President, Indus./Organizational Solutions, Inc., to Brian Va-
vra, Research Assistant to Professor Mark S. Brodin (Jun. 25, 2009). LegeJ added that "com-
monly the impact can be defended based on test validity," which as noted above in Part VI.A 
could not be demonstrated here. 
418 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 24-25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) (citations omit-
ted). "Year after year, test scores line up in the same race-regimented order, with whites and 
Asians faring better on most standard employment exams than blacks and Latinos." Thompson, 
supra note 410. 
419 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 156 (D. Conn. 2006). 
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reading level required may exceed that needed on the job, exacerbating 
disparities among racial subgroups in reading comprehension; (2) racial 
minorities are less "test wise" than white test-takers, and multiple-choice 
tests are particularly susceptible to test-taking strategies; (3) a test-taker's 
unfavorable view of a test's validity negatively influences performance, 
and evidence indicates that minority test-takers generally have a less fa-
vorable view of traditional written tests.420 
As the Industrial-Organizational Psychologists informed the Court in 
Ricci, "[r]egardless of the exact cause of the disparity, it is clear that the 
use of written, multiple-choice tests beyond what is justified by the de-
mands of a particular job has the effect of disproportionately excluding 
minority candidates without any corresponding increase in job perfor-
mance.,,421 Boston College psychology professor Janet Helms had similar-
ly advised the New Haven CSB.422 
Part of the explanation for the disparity between the scores of minori-
ties and whites in situations like the NHFD no doubt lies in their different 
experiences and opportunities. White firefighters are often second or third 
generation firefighters, sometimes within the same department. 423 In New 
420 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 24-25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). Also contributing 
to the test success gap, candidates of lower socioeconomic status may not have the same expo-
sure to the experiences covered by, or the opportunities to prepare for, the test. loint App., supra 
note 53, at 128. Studies of SAT results show a strong positive correlation between multiple-
choice scores and family income. Neal Gabler, The College Admissions Scam, Bos. SUNDAY 
GLOBE,lan. 10,2010, at C9; Lisa Kocian, Strong Showing on SAT's, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 
2009, at G I ("[average SAT scores go up] in lockstep with family income"). Individuals who 
speak English as a second language are obviously at a disadvantage on these tests. See loint 
App., supra note 53, at 126 ("Sometimes they do because they [switch languages] during pe-
riods of stress. And so they're unable to function as efficiently during the test as their monolin-
gual counterparts. Sometimes it occurs because they have insufficient time to complete the ex-
amination.") Finally, minority test-takers may score lower than white candidates if they are 
expected not to perform well-an adverse self-fulfilling prophecy. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
"Test scores may be lower if the test-takers are functioning under expectations that they will not 
perform well on the test. We talk about that in psychology as stereotype threat, fear that they 
will confirm negative stereotypes about their group by not performing well. This places the per-
son under undue stress and, rather than focusing on the test per se, they expend a lot of energy in 
trying to do the best they can rather than simply answering the questions." loint App .• supra 
note 53, at 127. See also Arthur, Edwards, & Barret, supra note 338, at 988, 992. 
421 /d. 
422 loint App., supra note 53, at 131 ("[W]e've always found a disparity between blacks 
and whites, Hispanics and whites on [multiple choice tests]. The disparity has been about the 
same. It deviates by a couple of points. But we can almost tell you what your disparity will be 
even before the test is taken. "). 
423 Ossher, Brooks, & Robinson, supra note 27, at 1,8. 
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Haven, one incumbent captain's father and grandfather both served as fire 
chief in the NHFD; another firefighter's father and four uncles were fire-
fighters; and Frank Ricci himself has an uncle and two brothers who are 
firefighters. 424 Ricci even told an interviewer, "when we were kids, we 
could either be a fireman, or a fireman, or a fireman. ,,425 
This generational advantage gives white firefighters access to men-
toring, advice, and institutional knowledge that can prove valuable when 
maneuvering the civil service maze.426 One black New Haven firefighter 
complained to the CSB that "the people that have [the right] books are un-
cles, nephews, kids from people that have been in the Fire Department for 
years. . . . I never had anyone that was a grandfather or uncle or any-
body.,,427 Another commented, "You know, a lot of my Caucasian coun-
terparts, they've come into the fire houses when they were little kids.,,428 
A third summed it up to a reporter: "If you look at the history of the 
[NHFD] there's a group of folks, their fathers, their grandfathers, their un-
cles-they're all part of this network" that only white firefighters can util-
. 429 lze. 
The fire service in America has a long history of perpetuating lega-
cies, where working in the fire department becomes a family tradition, in-
deed the family business. 
In any career fire department, it is commonplace to see the same sur-
names on seniority rosters spanning decades. In essence, the fire service, 
like many other professions, can often exemplify "opportunity hoarding 
by one group to the detriment of another." Indeed, "opportunity hoard-
ing" can be widely seen in the numerous reverse discrimination suits 
against fire departments by individuals, such as [Ricci et.al.], seeking to 
424 See Allan & Bazelon, supra note 19. 
425 Jd. 
426 Professor Helms further explains: "Because men of color and women are often ex-
cluded from their white male co-workers, they are often excluded from the informal mentoring 
that happens in these groups. There is evidence to suggest that having guidance as to how to be-
have in interviews, as well as other kinds of coaching, may improve test performance .... [S]o 
often what will happen is that women and men of color have to earn their way into the brother-
hood of white firefighters. While they're earning their way into that brotherhood, that often 
means that they're doing things by themselves that their white male peers are doing collabora-
tively." Joint App., supra note 53, at 125, 129. Accordingly, their innovative approaches may 
work against them on the rigid civil service devices. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
149 (D. Conn. 2006). 
427 Joint App., supra note 53, at 71. 
42R Joint App., supra note 53, at 76. 
429 See Allan & Bazelon, supra note 19. 
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restore the former status quo, and falling victim to believing that every 
act that increases diversity on a firefighting force necessarily is inten-
tionally "racist" against whites.43o 
C. AL TERNA TIVES TO MULTIPLE-CHOICE TESTING 
225 
There was no dispute that the NHFD exams excluded all the African 
American candidates from promotion.43I Justice Kennedy conceded that 
"[t)he racial impact here was significant,,,432 and the City "was faced with 
a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. ,,433 The combination of 
weighting the written exam over the oral component, and then selecting 
candidates strictly in rank order, "cemented the disproportionate rejection 
of minority candidates for promotion [in the NHFD).,,434 Given the sub-
stantial evidence that the exams were not valid predictors of job perfor-
mance, the City was legally obligated to consider altematives.435 
The City could most easily have reduced the racial impact by chang-
ing the ratio of the multiple-choice exam and the oral interview, as Brid-
geport had done.436 Or it could have suspended the "rule-of-three" to allow 
wider consideration of qualified candidates with more potential as super-
visors.437 Discarding rank-ordering in favor of banding, a technique that 
430 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) 
(citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
431 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). 
432 1d at 2678. 
433 Id at 2662. 
434 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 4,22,26-27, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
435 "Where two or more selection procedures are available which serve the user's legiti-
mate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship, and which are substantially equally va-
lid for a given purpose, the user should use the procedure which has been demonstrated to have 
the lesser adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B (1990), cited in Officers for Justice v. Civil 
Servo Comm'n of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721,727 (9th Cir. 1992). 
436 A reverse discrimination challenge to Bridgeport's favoring of the oral examination 
was rejected. See Bolton V. City of Bridgeport, 467 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. Conn. 2006). But anoth-
er case, filed by twelve white firefighters challenging the rescoring of the 2006 lieutenant's ex-
am from 50% written to 75% oral, was settled favorably to the plaintiffs' advantage in 2009 af-
ter Ricci came down. See Keila Torres, White Firefighters Settle Promotion Lawsuits Against 
Bridgeport, CONN. POST, Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://www.ctpost.comldefaultlarticle 
IWhite-firefighters-settle-promotion-lawsuits-272036.php. 
437 See, e.g., Glass City Black Bros. v. Neeb, 540 F. Supp. 852, 855 (D. Ohio 1982). On 
the rare occasion when a fire chief defies custom and passes over the highest scorer on the writ-
ten exam for promotion, other forces may intervene, as happened when the Civil Service Com-
mission overturned the appointment of the man third on the eligible list in Belmont, Massachu-
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combines candidates with close scores into one unit from which the hiring 
authority may appoint any member, thus recognizing the limits and margin 
of error ofthe tests, is another alternative to which some courts resorted.438 
The point is that lock-step appointments based solely on test scores carried 
out to the hundredths place, generating meaningless distinctions, should be 
replaced with a more flexible practice that permits the appointing authority 
to take into consideration other critical skills not measured by the written 
exam. 
From a broader perspective, how should fire departments meaning-
fully identify leadership and management skills, command presence, and 
interpersonal facility of their potential supervisors? Testing expert Hornick 
suggested one such approach to the New Haven CSB: 
There are other alternatives to just the written job knowledge [test] that 
you used in that initial stage and to the oral interview process that I be-
lieve would have demonstrated less adverse impacts, that I believe would 
have increased the likelihood of getting the best candidates at the top of 
the list so you would have identified the best possible people and you 
would not have had the artifacts in the development of the test that con-
tributed to the adverse impact that you received . 
. . . For example, you were not using an assessment center process, 
which is essentially an opportunity for candidates to demonstrate their 
knowledge of the SOP's, standard operating procedures, to demonstrate 
how they would address a particular problem as opposed to just verbally 
saying it or identifying the correct option on a written test. 
For example, there's concepts of situation judgment tests that can be de-
veloped and designed, customized within organizations that demonstrate 
dramatically less adverse impacts that are very well received by candi-
dates that test the ability to apply their knowledge as opposed to just 
memorize and give the correct answer from a multiple choice, recogniz-
setts. See Connie Page, State Panel Overrules Fire Chief, Civil Service Vacates '07 Decision on 
Captain, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 17,2009, at G 1. The chief based his selection on the oral interview, 
which rated the candidate's leadership abilities. /d. The Commission found the chief not only 
"violated basic merit principles" but harmed department morale by skipping the two top scorers. 
/d. 
438 See Chicago Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 656 (7th CiT. 
2001); Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680,684·-85 (7th CiT. 2004); Officers for Justice v. 
Civil Servo Comm'n of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721 (9th CiT. 1992); Bradley v. City of Lynn, 
443 F. Supp. 2d 145,173-74 (D. Mass. 2006) (banding scores within an eight-point range). See 
generally John W. Lasky, Loosen the Shackles on Pennsylvania Local Government's Hiring A u-
thority: An Argumentfor Banding, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 445 (1999). Efforts to band scores are often 
fiercely resisted by white officers and their unions. See Ballou, supra note 414, at G I (Superior 
Court judge issued injunction preventing banding). 
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ing what's the correct answer from a particular reading source. 
[A] person's leadership skills, their command presence, their interper-
sonal skills, their management skills, their tactical skills could have been 
identified and evaluated in a much more appropriate way that would 
have tested their real skills and not necessarily their ability to in two-and-
a-half minutes describe.439 
227 
An assessment center is "a form of standardized evaluation that seeks 
to test multiple dimensions of job qualification through observation of job-
related exercises [primarily job simulations] and other assessment tech-
niques.,,44o Multiple assessors observe and rate how candidates handle the 
problems and challenges of the job as they role-play while viewing videos 
of a fire scene, respond to questions, and formulate appropriate orders.441 
About 60% to 70% of fire departments reportedly now use them,442 and 
there is a consensus among industrial psychologists that, as measures of 
skills rather than knowledge, they are better predictors of job performance 
than other forms of promotional testing. 443 Used properly, assessment cen-
ters are able to reliably measure leadership capacity, problem-solving 
skills, and command presence.444 The research literature also demonstrates 
that they reduce adverse impact on racial minorities.445 Despite the ob-
439 Joint App., supra note 53, at 101--02; Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 
(D. Conn. 2006). 
440 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 4,22,26-27, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) (citations 
omitted). See also Floyd Delon, Assessment Center Screenings[or School Administration Certi-
fication and Employment: Possible Legal Challenges, 43 ED. LAW REP. 841 (1988); Charles 
Hale, Assessment Centers, LAW & ORDER, Feb. 1,2005, at 22. 
441 See Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 29-30, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428). 
442 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2705 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also 
Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 318, at 345. 
443 Hale, supra note 440. 
444 See also Chris Williams, Video Assessments Gain Ground as Way to Grade Future 
Teachers, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 3,2010. 
445 Brief for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondents at 29-32, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428) (citations omit-
ted); Ellen Zweig, Challenges to Employment Testing Under Title VJJ: Creating "Built In 
Headwinds" For the Civil Service Employer, 12 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 749, 770 (1984). But cf 
Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 741 n.17 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (black candidates for 
promotion to police sergeant fared much better on the written test score than on the assessment 
center). 
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vious downsides of cost446 and time, several courts have recommended the 
assessment center as a more valid and less discriminatory alternative for 
fi . I' 447 Ire supervIsor se ectlons. 
The promotional process used by the military, referred to positively 
in Grutter v. Bollinger,448 is also instructional. The stated goal of the Ar-
my's selection system is to identify those officers who have demonstrated 
that they possess the professional and moral qualifications, integrity, phys-
ical fitness, and ability to successfully perform the duties expected of an 
officer in the next higher grade.449 The selection is overseen by boards 
composed of experienced senior officers who review the entire perfor-
mance record of each officer being considered for promotion.450 Every-
thing that is in his or her military records-including decorations and 
medals, dates of service, dates of assignments, duty positions (past and 
present), performance reports, educational accomplishments, military 
training, Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score, and records of discip-
linary action-is considered.451 Officers are scored on a scale of 150 pro-
motion points based on their self-confidence, bearing, oral expression and 
conversational skill, knowledge of basic soldiering, knowledge of world 
affairs, awareness of military programs, and attitude.452 Although written 
exams are used to test basic knowledge, the prime consideration is past 
performance, measured by periodic feedback and formal evaluation re-
portS.453 
As another alternative, many public employers use a layered ap-
proach like that of Jackson, Mississippi, which selects police sergeants by 
way of a three-stage process.454 The first step is a written test. Those who 
446 Assessment centers can cost nearly ten times the amount per candidate than paper and 
pencil tests do. Zweig, supra note 445, at 771; Donald Brush, IdentifYing Managerial Potential, 
PERSONNEL, May, 1980, at 68. The economic benefits of selecting the right manager may, how-
ever, exceed the out-of-pocket expenses. Zweig, supra note 445, at 771. 
447 See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,513 
(8th Cir. 1977); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 360-62 
(8th Cir. 1980). 
448 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003). 
449 The Army Officer Promotion System, MILITARY.COM, 
http://www.military.comiM ilitaryCareers/Content/O, 145 56 ,Promotions _ ArmL Officer,OO. html. 
450 Id. 
451 Id. 
452 Id. 
453 See id. 
454 See Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728 (S.D. Miss. 2003). See also Bradley 
v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 175 (D. Mass. 2006) (recommending multi-pronged test-
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pass progress to the second stage, which consists of simulation exercises 
like those used in assessment centers. Finally, there is a structured inter-
view.455 The written test is thus used merely as a screening, not ranking, 
device, covering the basic knowledge that persons occupying the position 
should know. Other departments are experimenting with variations on 
multiple-choice devices in which test-takers view video simulations and 
are permitted to respond by selecting more than one answer, valuing di-
vergent as opposed to convergent thinking, which recognizes that most 
real-life problems do not have a single answer.456 
VII. CLOSING REFLECTIONS ON MERIT, QUALIFICATIONS, AND 
DIVERSITY 
Tests often create a mere illusion ofmeritocracy.457 This is particular-
ly the case with civil service exams, and some courts have candidly distin-
guished "merit" from the questionable results of these sorting devices.458 
A better definition of the complex term "merit" in the context of a fire su-
pervisor must mean the ability to effectively lead.459 This is "a reflection 
of character, integrity, and command constructs that do not lend them-
selves well to written 'job knowledge' tests .... [J]ob knowledge is only a 
small part of the job performance domain.,,460 Nor do one-size-fits-all mul-
tiple-choice tests measure a candidate's determination, courage, or calm 
under pressure, all of which should be key components in the promotion 
of superior officers.461 
Justice William Brennan recognized many years ago how dubious the 
equation of merit and civil service ranking truly is. In Johnson v. Santa 
Clara Transportation Agency,462 the public employer promoted a female 
ing, including physical ability). 
455 Hearn, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728. 
456 Thompson, supra note 410. 
457 Christopher J. Meade argued this point, unsuccessfully, for respondents in Ricci v. 
DeStefano. Tr. Oral Arg., supra note 30, at 57. See also Lawton, supra note 22. 
458 See, e.g., Adams v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 609, 613-16 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Chicago 
had never considered merit for promotions to sergeant in the 100 years after written exams were 
instituted for the police officers.") 
459 Brief for International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-
1428). 
460 1d. at 18. 
461 Kim, supra note 346, at 12. 
462 See Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
230 REVIEW OF LA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 20:2 
over a male despite the fact that the former had a civil service score of se-
venty-three and the latter a seventy-five.463 In rejecting the male candi-
date's claim that the employer unfairly discriminated against him, Brennan 
observed: 
Justice Scalia's dissent predicts that today's decision will loose a flood 
of "less qualified" minorities and women upon the work force .... [That 
speculation] ignores the fact that "[it] is a standard tenet of personnel 
administration that there is rarely a single, 'best qualified' person for a 
job. An effective personnel system will bring before the selecting official 
several fully-qualified candidates who each may possess different 
attributes which recommend them for selection .... [F]inal determina-
tions as to which candidate is 'best qualified' are at best subjective." 
This case provides an example of precisely this point. Any differences in 
qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the 
least.464 
If employers continue to rely on multiple-choice tests in the absence 
of demonstrable proof that they truly predict job performance, and in the 
face of evidence that they unfairly disadvantage minorities and women, 
does that not constitute intentional discrimination?465 At least one court 
has pondered this: 
[P]laintiffs have alleged that the City engaged in intentional race dis-
crimination, or disparate treatment, by proceeding to use the results of a 
test which it knew had a discriminatory impact and rely, in support of 
their contention in this regard, on the fact that the City used the test re-
sults, without making any adjustment to the results or cut-score, after the 
Justice Department had specifically informed the City that the test had a 
disparate impact. In the court's opinion, however, City officials involved 
in the decision to so proceed, all of whom, as it happens, were black, tes-
tified credibly that they had no intent to discriminate. All of the City's 
witnesses explained that while they were aware of the Justice Depart-
ment's comments regarding the test and test results, they believed those 
comments related to any future exams they might use and interpreted the 
Justice Department's letter as expressly approving their use of thc test 
463 !d. at 624-25. 
4641d. at 641 n.17 (citations omitted). As Professor Selmi pointed out, it is "remarkable" 
that the two-point test score differential could be thought to tell us anything meaningful about 
the qualifications of these candidates. See Michael Selmi, Testingfor Equality: Merit, Efficien-
cy, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1995). 
465 See generally Mark S. Brodin, The Role a/Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimina-
tion: The Seniority Question Under Title Vll, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943 (1984) (invoking the common 
law rule that an actor intends the foreseeable consequences of his action). 
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results for this particular round of promotions. Their interpretation in this 
regard was reasonable, in the court's opinion, given the language of the 
Justice Department's letter, and in the absence of further proof to suggest 
a basis for inferring an intent on the part of City officials to discriminate, 
the court concludes that plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim is without 
merit and should be dismissed. 466 
231 
If New Haven had continued to rely on selection devices that courts 
have found discriminatory, and which the City itself agreed in consent de-
crees to correct, and had simply certified the 2003 civil service results, 
could it not be said that the City was knowingly perpetuating the white 
male privilege that inevitably results?467 Imagine the reverse situation, 
where it is minority or female candidates who are the consistent beneficia-
ries of such practices, to the exclusion of white males. Would the Ricci 
majority be so sanguine as to permit that status quo to continue? 
Some years ago the Supreme Court confronted such a situation.468 St. 
Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by the Missouri Depart-
ment of Corrections, was warned in a consultant's study that "too many 
blacks were in positions of power," and that "blacks possessed too much 
power at St. Mary's.,,469 The facility subsequently replaced all its black 
administrators with whites, and in the first year of the new regime twelve 
black staff and only one white were fired. 470 Shift commander Melvin 
Hicks challenged his discharge in a Title VII case. At trial, he successfully 
discredited the employer's justifications for his termination, namely by 
proving that the minor disciplinary infractions cited were routinely ig-
nored when committed by white employees.471 The district court found in 
fact that there was a "crusade" against the black plaintiff, and that he had 
466 Hearn v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728, 743 (S.D. Miss. 2003). See also United 
States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (Vulcan Society as interve-
nor claimed the city's "continued reliance on and perpetuation of these racially discriminatory 
hiring processes constitute intentional race discrimination," a claim left unresolved after finding 
of disparate impact). 
467 This is precisely the allegation firefighter Briscoe made in his unsuccessful suit against 
New Haven. See Part I1I.B. 
468 See St. Mary's Honor etr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See generally Brodin, supra 
note 180. 
469 Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, supra note 
180, at 193. 
470 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
471 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 508. 
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been placed on "the express track to termination.,,472 Hicks thus succeeded 
in proving pretext-the final phase of a McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
G fd ' 473 reen case 0 Isparate treatment. 
Notwithstanding these findings, and breaking with precedent, Justice 
Scalia concluded for the Court that Hicks could prevail only if he proved 
in addition that St. Mary's resorted to its crusade and pretextual justifica-
tion to hide racial discrimination, as opposed to some other motive like 
personal animosity.474 The latter explanation was purely speculative, not 
raised by st. Mary's at trial, and sharply contradicted by the evidence at 
tria1.475 On remand, judgment was entered for the defendant.476 
This ruling for an employer that responded to a perceived imbalance 
in favor of black employees by summarily terminating them stands in stark 
contrast to Ricci, which condemned New Haven for trying to avoid white-
only promotions by scuttling a selection process of dubious validity. While 
St. Mary's Honor Center raised the bar for proof of traditional discrimina-
tion cases (brought by minorities or women), Ricci lowers it for white 
male plaintiffs bringing reverse discrimination suits. 
Ricci v. DeStefano plays quite well with the post-racial narrative so 
popular in certain political circles-that ours is now a "color-blind" socie-
ty, with racism against black Americans a thing of the past; that, indeed, 
"they" now have too much power, and the pendulum has swung too much 
in their direction; that together with immigrants, "they" are stealing jobs 
from hard-working whites, who are the new victims of discrimination that 
require special legal protection.477 It is truly the stuff of fiction. 
472 Hicks v. St Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. at 1251. 
473 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
474 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510-11. 
475 Id. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting); Brodin, supra note 180, at 192-99. The Eighth Cir-
cuit had ruled, not surprisingly, that it was improper for a court "to assume~without evidence to 
support the assumption~that defendants' actions were somehow 'personally motivated.'" Hicks 
v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992). 
476 Hicks v. St Mary's Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996). 
477 See Richard Kim, Race, Lies and Videotape: Lessons From the Shirley Sherrod Saga, 
THE NATION, July 16,2010, available at http://www.thenation.comlblog/379511race-lies-and-
videotape-Iessons-shirley-sherrod-saga. 
